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Methods of payment are [a] critical environmental force that must be
alignedwiththe objective ofimprovingquality. Currentpayment methods
do not adequately encourage or supporttheprovision of qualityhealth care,
and in some instances, they may actually impede local innovations and
efforts to improve quality.'
I. Introduction
In market-based economies, the customer is king.' Sellers of goods and
services routinely condition their right to payment on customer satisfaction or
offer money-back guarantees or warranties. Manufacturers and retail outlets
willingly replace defective items and allow unhappy buyers to return purchases
with "no questions asked." Providers of sophisticated commodities and ser-
vices pledge to meet deadlines, quality standards, and other performance criter-
ia, and theytie their right to compensation to these commitments. When goods
or services fall short ofpurchasers' expectations, providers suffer financially.
1. INST. OF MED., CROSSiNG TE QUAIT CHAM ANEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE
21ST CENTURY 193 (Nat'lAcad. Press 2001).
2. France, as always, remains the exception that proves the rule. See Suzanne Daley,A
Spy's Advice to French Retailers: Politeness Pays, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2000, at A4 (noting
routine failure of French retailers to provide prompt and polite service to customers).
RESULT-BASED COMPENSATIONFOR HEALTH CARE
This link between payment and performance, the hallmark of a result-based
compensation arrangement (RBCA), encourages providers to perform well.
RBCAs prevail throughout the economy. Many lawyers of diverse types
work on contingency, as do accountants who represent taxpayers before the
Internal Revenue Service and local taxing authorities. Investment bankers,
stockbrokers, real estate agents, auctioneers, department store clerks, insurance
agents, advertising agencies, political consultants, and telemarketers work on
commission, as do corporate officers, directors, and executives who receive
stock options, partners who share in a firm's profits, employees who receive
bonuses, and service personnel who receive tips. Salaried employees partici-
pate in RBCAs when their pension plans hold their employers' stock.
RBCAs are common because they effectively solve a variety of agency
problems. From a principal's perspective, an RBCA reduces the need to
monitor an agent's performance by aligning the interests ofprincipal and agent
as they have jointly defined them. From an agent's perspective, an RBCA
means there will be less arguing over whether the agent accurately perceived
the principal's objectives and acted accordingly. For both parties, an RBCA
will result in an appropriate amount of effortbythe agent at an appropriate cost
to the principal. By encouraging agents to produce outcomes that principals
want, RBCAs help such relationships work smoothly.
Given the prevalence of RBCAs throughout the economy, their rarity in
the health care sector is striking. Health care providers almost never offer
guarantees or tie their compensation to the quality of their work. As former
Assistant Secretary of Health and Human Services Dr. Philip Lee observed,
providers "get paid for what [they] do, not what [they] accomplish."3 The
enormity of the health care sector makes the absence of RBCAs particularly
significant: Americans spend approximately $1.2 trillion annually on health
care services, almost none of which are warranted to meet measurable stan-
dards of quality.'
The rarity of RBCAs would be unproblematic if purchasers invariably
received value fortheir health care dollars. Unfortunately, the quality of Amer-
ican medicine varies widely. Many Americans receive high quality services,
but many do not. Some services are over-utilized; others are under-utilized;
utilization rates vary from place to place in unexplained ways; and few provid-
ers consistently deliver "evidence-based medicine."5 Americans also spend
3. DAVID A. KINDIG, PURCHASING PoPULATION HEALTH 1 (E. Mich. Press 1997); see
also David A. Kindig, Purchasing Population Health: Aligning Financial Incentives to Im-
prove Health Outcomes, 33 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 223,223 (1998).
4. See infra Part V (detailing limited circumstances in which RBCAs are employed in
health care).
5. See infra Part II (detailing shortcomings in quality of health care delivered in United
States); see also David Classen & Peter Kilbridge, Healthcare Quality and the Prevention of
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tens of billions of dollars annually on medical services whose value is ques-
tionable or nonexistent.'
Medical treatment also frequently results in injury to patients. One
analysis estimated that injuries caused by physicians accounted for 180,000
deaths per year! The Institute of Medicine adopted a lower figure for deaths
attributable to injury during a hospitalization - between 44,000 and 98,000
deaths per year - but even this figure makes medical errors the eighth leading
cause of death in the United States.8 Every year, medical errors kill more
people than motor vehicle accidents, breast cancer, and AIDS.9
Any other industry responsible for the deaths of 50,000 to 100,000 of its
customers each year and for seriously injuring many more would be the target
of aggressive criminal investigations and massive civil lawsuits. When tires
manufactured by the Bridgestone/Firestone Company were found to be defec-
tive, Congress held hearings, prosecutors threatened criminal proceedings, and
plaintiffs' attorneys filed several nationwide class actions. Yet Bridgestone/
Firestone was, at worst, responsible for the loss of fewer than three hundred
lives over a period of several years.'" Medical errors kill more people than this
every day.
The logic of employing RBCAs to address medical mistakes and other
deficiencies in health care services rests on a simple intuition: when providers
are paid to deliver high quality care, they are more likely to do so. Because the
health care sector is bereft of RBCAs, Americans receive services that range
Medical Errors 4 (June 2000) (report published by First Consulting Group) (on file with
authors) ("The logic of evidence-based medicine is simple: the quality and safety of patient care
are determined in large measure by the processes of diagnosis and treatment When these
processes are scientifically optimal, the patient's chances of having a good outcome are optimal.
When they vary, outcomes vary.... Where it has been consistently applied, evidence-based
medicine has yielded consistently superior patient outcomes."). Unfortunately, as the Institute
of Medicine concluded in a recent report, "there is a great deal of variability in medical practice
and, oftentimes, a lack of adherence to medical standards based on scientific evidence." INST.
OF MND., To ERRIs HUMAN 16 (1999).
6. See infra Part R (documenting inappropriate utilization).
7. Lucian Lap, Error in Medicine, 272 JAMA 1851,1861(1994).
8. See INST. OF MED., supra note 5, at 22 (documenting figures). Thesefigures have been
controversial; researchers have argued thatmany patients would have died anyway orthatreviewer
assessments are unreliable. See Rodney A. Hayward & Timothy P. Hofer, Estimating Hospital
DeathsDue toMedicalErrors: PreventabilifyIs in theEye oftheReviewer, 286 JAMA415 (2001)
(noting significant inter-rater variability in determination ofwhether particular death was prevent-
able); Clement S. McDonald et al., D eaths Due to Medical Erro rsAre Exaggerated in Institute of
Medicine Report, 284 JAMA 93 (2000). Those involved in the preparation of the Institute of
Medicine report have defended these figures. See Lucian Leape, Institute ofMedicine Medical
ErrorFiguresAre Not Exaggerated, 284 JAMA 95 (2000) (rebutting criticisms ofIOM results).
9. INST. OF MED., supra note 5, at 1.
10. See Nat'l Highway Traffic SafetyAdmin., Firestone Recalls (Oct 4,2001), available
at http:/Iwww.nhtsa.dotgovhot/firestone/update.html (totaling 271 fatalities).
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in quality from extraordinarily good to extraordinarily bad with outcomes that
vary accordingly. If Americans want higher quality, fewer errors, and better
health, we should link compensation to results.
The Institute of Medicine (1OM) emphasized the need for quality-related
incentives in Crossing the Quality Chasm, a report released in March of this
year. According to the IOM, "current [compensation] methods provide little
financial reward for improvements in the quality of health care delivery, and
may even inadvertently pose barriers to innovation.""1 To encourage health
care providers to employ "best practices" and to "achieve better patient out-
comes," the IOM recommended that payment methods should "provide an
opportunity for providers to share in the benefits of quality improvement
[with] rewards... close to the level at which the reengineering and process
redesign needed to improve quality are likely to take place."12 In other words,
the IOM recommended RBCAs.
This Article develops the case for health care RBCAs. Part H briefly sur-
veys the literature that led the IOM and other prominent authorities to give
health care providers low marks for quality. Part H then focuses on two areas -
coronary artery bypass surgery and surgical anesthesia - in which quality has
improved greatly in recent years, to demonstrate that poor quality is not inevi-
table if appropriate incentives are employed. Part I identifies the prevailing
methods of compensating health providers and shows that none tie providers'
financial prospects to patients' well-being. Part IV explains how RBCAs
work, demonstrates their theoretical potentialto enhance quality, and addresses
some common objections to using them in connection with medical services.
Part V identifies the small number of cutting-edge sectors of the health care
market that already use RBCAs. It also discusses other areas in which health
care RBCAs could be deployed. Part VI offers a brief conclusion.
I. The Crisis of Quality in American Medicine
[Q]uality problems... abound in American medicine. The majority of
these problems are not rare, unpredictable, or inevitable concomitants of
the delivery ofcomplex, modernhealthcare. Rather, theyarefrighteningly
common, often predictable, and frequently preventable. 3
Readers who are unfamiliar with the literature on health services may find
it hard to believe that the quality of American medicine varies as greatly as we
contend. The literature shows that serious quality problems afilict every aspect
11. INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 19.
12. Id.
13. MarkR. Chassin,IsHealth CareReadyforSixSigma Quality?, 76 MIIBANKQ. 565,
566 (1998); see also Thomas Bodenheimer, TheAmerican Health Care System: The Movement
for Improved Quality in Health Care, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 488 (1999) (outlining history of
quality improvement movement in United States).
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of the American health care system, irrespective of insurance coverage and
delivery arrangements. Part l.A presents a brief, general survey that demon-
strates the extent ofthe need for quality improvement. Part I.B focuses on the
highly developed literature detailing efforts to improve the quality of surgical
anesthesia and coronary artery bypass grafting (CABG). In both areas, dra-
matic improvements in quality were realized shortly after the introduction of
appropriate incentives.
A. The Quality ofHealth Care in the United States
The literature on health care quality is replete with statements that look
like tabloid headlines: "one-fourth of hospital deaths may be preventable";
1 4
"180,000 people may die" each year "partly as a result of iatrogenic injury";15
"one-third of some hospital procedures may expose patients to risk without
improving their health. 1 6 Unfortunately, these dire statements are actual
research findings. As a 1998 literature review observed:
[the] dominant finding... is that there are large gaps between the care
people should receive and the care they do receive. This is true for all
three types of care -preventive, acute, and chronic - whether one goes for
a check-up, a sore throat, or diabetic care. It is true whether one looks at
overuse or undemse. It is true in different types of health care facilities
and for different types of health insurance. It is true for all age groups,
from children to the elderly. And it is true whether one is looking at the
whole country or a single city... A simple average of the findings of the
preventive care studies shows that about 50% of people received recom-
mended care. An average of 70%... received recommended acute care,
and30%received contraindicated acute care. For chronic conditions, 60%
received recommended care and 20% received contraindicated care.
17
Table 118 presents a selection ofthe results that support this dismal con-
clusion. It shows that American health care providers routinely omit indicated
procedures of known value, frequently perform treatments and surgeries that
are unnecessary and intfficacious, and employ practice patterns that vary
widely for no good reason.' 9 Adverse drug events and the use of unproven
14. RobertH.Brooketl.,HealthSystemReformandQuality,276JAMA476,477 (1996).
15. Robert W. Dubois & Robert H. Brook, Preventable Deaths: Who, How Often, and
Why?, 109 ANNALs INm NALMED. 582 (1988).
16. Stephen M. Shortell et al ,Assessing the Impact of Continuous Quality Improvement
on ClinicalPractice: Whatlt Will Take toAccelerate Progress, 76 MIBANK Q. 593,593(1998).
17. Mark A. Schuster et al., How Good Is the Quality of Health Care in the United
States?, 76 MiLANK Q. 517,520-21 (1998).
18. See infraAppendix, Table 1,at 1486.
19. See Chassin, supra note 13, at 570-78 (differentiating between overuse, underuse, and
misuse); Schuster et al., supra note 17, at 518 (differentiating between too much care, too little
care, and wrong care).
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treatments also are distressingly common. 20 Although managed care domi-
nates the recent public policy debate, "managed care is not the problem, qual-
ity is. 
2l
Health care is also plagued by unacceptably high error rates. In a 1999
report, the IOM concluded that medical errors occur with extraordinary fre-
quency, generate intolerable numbers of deaths and injuries, and entail stag-
gering social costs.' Table 2' summarizes some of the studies that led the
IOM to this conclusion. These figures probably understate actual error rates,
injuries, and costs because under-reporting of medical errors is rampant.24
To put these problems into perspective, Table 3' compares the perfor-
mance of the health care sector with other industries. At a defect rate of 20%,
roughly the frequency with which doctors erroneously prescribe antibiotics for
ambulatory patients, the credit card industry would botch nine million transac-
tions a day and banks would deposit thirty-six million checks in the wrong
accounts.' Yet, by health care standards, the appallingly high 20% defect rate
for antibiotic prescriptions for ambulatory patients is low. Health care "fre-
quently produces defects at rates as high as 500,000 per million - as exempli-





There are a number of reasons why quality varies widely, including the
decentralized and fragmented nature of the health care delivery system, the
20. David W. Bates et al.,Incidence ofAdverseDrugEvents and PotentialAdverse Drug
Events: Implications for Prevention, 274 JAMA 29 (1995); David C. Classen et al., Adverse
Drug Events in Hospitalized Patients: Fxcess Length of Stay, Extra Costs and Atributable
Mortality, 277 JAMA 301 (1997); Rainu Kaushal et aL, Medication Errors andAdverse Drug
Events in Pediatric Inpatients, 285 JAMA 2114 (2001); David P. Phillips et al., Increase in
U.S. Medication-Error Deaths between 1983 and 1993,351 LANCET 255 (1999);
21. Robert H. Brook, Managed Care Is Not the Problem, Quality Is, 278 JAMA 1612,
1612 (1997); see Schuster et al., supra note 17, at 556 (Whether the care is preventive, acute,
or chronic, it frequently does not meet professional standards.").
22. INsT. OF MED., supra note 5, at 1. After this report was released, President Clinton
commissioned a federal task force to devise a strategy for making health care safer. See
QuALT INIERAmNCY COORDINATION TASK FORCE, DOING WHAT CouNTs FOR PATmN
SAFETY: FEDERALACrONs TO REDUCE MEDICAL ERRORS AND THEIRIMPACT 1 (Feb. 2000),
available at http'/www.quic.gov (detailing governmental plans to enhance quality).
23. See infra Appendix, Table 2, at 1489.
24. See INST. OF MED., supra note 5, at 26 (noting under-reporting of medical errors).
Under-reporting of medication errors in hospitals is especially dramatic. One study found that
incident reports were filed for only three of fifty-four admitted patients who experienced adverse
drug events. Id. at 29. This under-reporting occurs for a variety of reasons, including the
failure to recognize the error and the liability concerns of the individuals involved.
25. See infra Appendix, Table 3, at 1490.
26. See Chassin, supra note 13, at 570.
27. Id. at 587.
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dominance ofthird party payors who have historically cared more about costs
than quality, the tradition of deference to the medical profession to handle
issues of quality, the lack of visibility of the issue for consumers and politi-
cians, the process through which providers are trained and socialized, the
presence of multiple agency relationships, and the lack of competitive alterna-
tives to existing coverage and delivery arrangements. However, the absence
of direct financial incentives to deliver high quality services also contributes
to the problem. Although many hospitals and physicians profess a commit-
ment to providing high quality care, reality lags far behind the rhetoric. There
is a desperate need for mechanisms to encourage providers to make better
treatment decisions and to provide better care.
B. Quality Can Improve: The Cases of Surgical Anesthesia and
Coronary Artery Bypass Grafting
The results described in the preceding Part are not inevitable. Two exam-
ples demonstrate that providers can improve the quality ofhealth care dramati-
cally and quickly when given proper incentives.
1. Surgical Anesthesia
As Table 3 reflects, surgical anesthesia is one ofthe safest procedures in
medicine, and the only medical procedure shown that approaches industrial
standards of quality. Death rates from surgical anesthesia are in the neighbor-
hood of five deaths per million encounters.'
Surgical anesthesia was not always this safe. In the late 1800s and early
1900s, itwas decidedly hazardous; patients routinely suffered significant mor-
bidity and mortality. As safer anesthetic agents and better systems of screen-
ing and monitoring patients developed, death rates steadily declined. By the
1950s, death rates ranged between 1 and 10 per 10,000 encounters." Anesthe-
sia mortality stabilized at this rate for more than two decades.
Mortality and morbidity rates fell again after a 1978 article refrained the
issue of anesthesia safety as one of human factor analysis.3° Inthe mid-1980s,
28. Id. at 569.
29. See, e.g., id at 569; Henry K. Beecher & Donald P. Todd, A Study of the Deaths
Associated with Anesthesia and Surgery, 140 ANNALS SURGERY 2 (1954); Robert D. Dripps et
al., The Role ofAnesthesia in SurgicalMortality, 178 JAMA 261 (1961); Otto C. Phillips et al,
The Baltimore Anesthesia Study Committee, 174 JAMA 2015 (1960); Ellison C. Pierce, Anal-
ysis ofAnesthetic Mishaps: Historical Perspectives, 22 INT'L A.NESTHWSOLOGY CLINCS 1, 5
(1984) (providing historical perspective on efforts to reduce anesthesia mortality).
30. See Jeffrey B. Cooper et al., Preventable Anesthesia Mishaps: A Study of Human
Factors, 49 ANESToESIOLoY 399 (1978) (framing anesthesia morbidity and mortality in terms
of human factors that contributed to outcome); see also Jeffrey B. Cooper et al., An Analysis of
Major Errors andEquipment Failures in Anesthesia Management:. ConsiderationsforPreven-
tion andDetection, 60 ANESTHSIFOLOGY 34 (1984) (same). Much of the impetus for this initi-
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the American Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA) promulgated standards of
optimal anesthesia practicethat relied heavily on systems-based approaches for
preventing errors. 3' Because patients frequently sued anesthetists when bad
outcomes occurred and because deviations from the ASA guidelines made the
imposition of liability much more likely, anesthetists had substantial incentives
to comply. As individual providers adoptedthe specifiedpractices, intra-opera-
tive deaths became increasingly rare. 2 Anesthetists also developed improved
monitoring techniques and other strategies to reduce morbidity and mortality.33
Providers deserve great praise for enhancing the safety of anesthesia-
related services to the point that it is one of the safest components of a hospi-
talization. However, we should consider why anesthesia mortality stabilized
at a rate more than one hundred times higher than its current level for more
than two decades. The problem was not lack ofinformation. To the contrary,
anesthesia safety was studied extensively during the period. A better hypothe-
sis is that anesthetists grew accustomed to a mortality rate that was exemplary
by health care standards, but that was still higher than it should have been.
From a psychological perspective, this low frequency encouraged anesthetists
to treat each bad outcome as a tragic but unforeseen and unpreventable event.
Indeed, anesthetists likely viewed each individual bad outcome as the manifes-
tation of an irreducible baseline rate of medical mishap. 4
Physicians' insistence on complete clinical autonomy reinforced the
tendency to regard individual bad outcomes as inevitable. As long as anesthe-
tists had comparable mortality rates, the occasional bad outcome could pass
without much comment or be ascribed to bad luck. This complacency, and the
associated excessive mortality, was disrupted only after providers adopted a
systems-based, technology-assisted approach to the problem. Thus, given the
right incentives, good information, and a systemic perspective, providers can
play a major role in enhancing patient safety.
ative was attributable to the efforts of Dr. Ellison (Jeep) Pierce, a prominent anesthesiologist
See Atul Gawande, When Doctors Make Mistakes, NEW YORKER, Feb. 1, 1999, at 40, 51-53
(discussing impact of Dr. Ellison).
31. See Ellison C. Pierce, The Development ofAnesthesia Guidelines and Standards, 16
QUALITY REV. BurT. 61 (1990) (documenting impact of anesthesia guidelines).
32. See Lucian L. Leape, Unnecessary Surgery, 13 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 363,379-80
(1992) ("[Flollowing the 1987 universal adoption by Massachusetts anesthetists of the Amer-
ican Society of Anesthesiologists' 'Standards for Basic Intra-0perative Monitoring,' the number
of deaths from hypoxia decreased to zero in the following year, and for the first time no lawsuits
were filed for hypoxic damage.").
33. See Chassin, supra note 13, at 569 (detailing development of improved monitoring
techniques).
34. Not surprisingly, prominent anesthesiologists reacted quite negatively to empirical
studies of their bad outcomes. See .Abajian et al., Critique of"A Study ofDeaths Associated
with Anesthesia and Surgery," 142 ANNALS SURGERY 138 (1955) (criticizing one such study
and defending quality of anesthesia).
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Certainly, anesthesia may have been particularly well suited for quality
improvement. Issues of causation were generally straightforward because typ-
ically there was only one anesthetist per procedure. Because surgical patients
had no on-going relationships with their anesthetist, victims were particularly
likely to sue. Damages also tended to be substantial because injuries attribut-
able to anesthesia were often severe. Finally, although judgment is implicated
in many aspects of anesthesiology, simple changes in design and monitoring
prevented a'substantial number of errors.
Other practice areas may lack certain of these attributes. Even so, sys-
tems-based approaches to quality and medical error have effectively prevented
patient injuries in diverse contexts. 5 For example, computerized systems for
dispensing and tracking prescription drugs have reduced the rate of medica-
tion errors in hospitals. After a V.A. hospital in Topeka, Kansas introduced
a bar coding system, medication errors dropped 64.5%.36 An academic medi-
cal center in Boston "credited its computer system with helping to reduce
serious drug-related problems by 55 %, saving $500,000 a year [and] up to $10
million [overall].
37
Despite the demonstrated effectiveness of computerized prescription drug
systems, many hospitals have been slow to adopt them and physicians resist
usingthem. Other safety-enhancing innovations have metthe same fate." This
35. See Chassin, supra note 13, at 577 ("[S]ystematic analyses of preventable complica-
tions have... revealed that faulty systems of care are responsible for error more often than
individuals."). This outcome should not be surprising, even though "jt]he sheer number of
specific interventions that good care requires is beyond the ability of any unaided human being
to recall and act on effecively... the dominant modes of practice still expect this impossible
degree of accomplishment" Id. at 576. Indeed, one author described "the role of doctor as
diagnostician," which involves "matching enormous streams of clinical data on patients to
enormous bodies of scientific literature," as "the equivalent of having travel agents book flights
from memory." Donald M. Berwick, Crossing the Bounday: ChangingMental Models in the
Service oflmprovement, 10 INT'L J. QUAIl HEALTH CARE 435,438 (1998).
Unfortunately, the current system is based on individual perfection, rather than systems-
based approaches to quality. This strategy is largely inconsistent with the available evidence
on quality and performance, which strongly suggests that "the performance of a system - from
the viewpoint of those served - depends far more crucially on how elements work together than
on how each element, in its role, performs separately." Id.
36. Lauran Neergaard, Admitting Mistakes: V-4. Hospitals Start New Plan to Combat
MedicalErrors (Feb. 19,2000), available at http'/www.abenews.go.com/sectionslivingDaily
Newsfmedmistskes000219.hml.
37. Milt Freudenheim, Corrective Medicine: New Technology Helps Health Care Avoid
Mistakes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3,2000, at Cl, C26.
38. Id.; see INST. OF MED., supra note 5, at 12-13 ("A number of practices have been
shown to reduce errors in the medication process. Several professional and collaborative
organizations interested in patient safety have developed and published recommendations for
safe medication practices, especially for hospitals. Although some of these recommendations
have been implemented, none have been universally adopted and some are not yet implemented
in a majority of hospitals.").
1436
RFSULT-BASED COMPENSA TION FOR HEALTH CARE
accounts for one ofthe IOM's most striking recommendations: that health care
organizations should "implement proven medication safetypractices." 39 In any
other industry, failure to adopt 'proven safety practices" would result in public
outrage, governmental investigations, substantial fines, and automatic tort lia-
bility. Yet, in health care, this failing passes with little notice or concern.
2. Coronary Artery Bypass Grafting (CABG)
CABG is a surgical treatment for blocked coronary arteries commonly
employed for patients suffering from angina (chest pain of cardiac origin).
Approximately 600,000 Americans receive CABG annually, making it one of
the most frequent surgical procedures.' To perform CABG, a hospital must
have a dedicated surgical team and invest in specialized equipment and staff,
including a heart-lung machine and an intensive care unit. At present, roughly
1,000 hospitals in the United States perform CABGs.
CABG was developed in the late 1960s. Shortly thereafter, the Inter-
society Commission for Heart Disease Resources (ICHDR) issued guidelines
for the procedure, including minimum caseload recommendations.41 These
guidelines were non-binding; physicians and hospitals were free to offer CABG
even if their expected volume fell below the recommended minimum. 42 At-
tracted by the potential revenue stream, many hospitals began offering CABG
and aggressively marketed their services to patients and referring physicians.
When studying the impact of CABG volume, health care researchers dis-
covered that surgeons with high-volume CABG practices and hospitals with
high-volume CABG units had significantly lower mortality rates. The differ-
ence in outcomes could be as much as a quadrupling of the risk of in-hospital
mortality.43 When surgeons changed hospitals, the mortality rates frequently
changed along with them.'
39. INST. OF MED., supra note 5, at 12 (recommendation 8.2).
40. See DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE CHALLENGE AND PoTmNIAL FOR
AssulRNG QUAITlY HEALTH CARE FOR THE 21ST CENTuRY (June 17, 1998), available at
http't/www.ahrq.gov/qual/21stcena.htm (presenting statistics on CABO utilization) [hereinafter
D.H.H.S., THE CHALLENGE].
41. SeeMICHAELL.M1IENSON,DEMANDINGMEDICALEXCELLENCE 187 (U. Chi. Press
1997).
42. See id.
43. See id. at 192 (noting quadrupling of risk); Kevin Grumbach et al, Regionalization
of Cardiac Surgery in the United States and Canada, 274 JAMA 1282 (1995) (reporting death
rates following cardiac bypass surgery were twice as high at California hospitals performing
fewer than 100 procedures per year than at hospitals performing 500 or more); Edward L.
Hannan, The Relation Between Volume and Outcome in Health Care, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1677, 1678 (1999) (noting in one study of 1989 data, "the risk-adjusted mortality rate for patients
of surgeons who performed fewer than 50 [bypass operations] (7.94%) was more than twice the
mortality rate for patients ofsurgeons who performed 150 or more procedures (3.57%)").
44. See MMLNSON, supra note 41, at 213.
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Although the conection between CABG volume and outcome was widely
known within medical circles, it did not influence referral patterns for
CABGs. In 1995, one-third of the hospitals performing CABG, or 327 hospi-
tals, failed to meet the ICHDR's recommended minimum volume, yet these
hospitals continued to receive referrals." Regulatory efforts to address this
problem by regionalizing CABG surgery or by limiting the opening of new
cardiac surgery units were largely unsuccessful because of the political power
of providers and a generalized commitment to provider autonomy.
Dramatic improvements in quality occurred only when New York and
Pennsylvania began collecting and publishing risk-adjusted "report cards" on
doctors and hospitals that performed CABGs.' As it became clear that
mortality rates for patients with similar risk factors differed widely across
providers, many hospitals and physicians had to confront the reality that they
were substandard performers. In response, hospitals that received poor grades
reengineered their systems." Some pressured physicians with low-volume
practices to stop performing CABG.'
Although the information seems to have had a greater effect on the
supply side (hospital efforts at self-improvement) than on the demand-side
(referral patterns), there was no arguing with the results.49 In New York, the
risk-adjusted death rate dropped by 40% after the report cards were issued.5 °
In Pennsylvania, hospitals that performed poorly in the 1990 report had
improved by the 1992 report, and the risk-adjusted mortality rate declined by
almost 25% between 1990 and 1993.51
45. See id. at 187 (documenting failure of many hospitals to meet recommended minimum
CABO volume).
46. See id. at 215 (describing introduction of report cards).
47. See id at 193-94 (describing reengineering efforts). For example, one hospital
discovered that the hardest cases were being routed to the least experienced surgeons because
hospital protocol required the first available surgeon be used in an emergency, and "precisely
because the high-volume surgeons were busy they were rarely available to handle emergencies."
Id.; see also Jonathan A. Showstack et al.,Association of Volume with Outcome of Coronary
Artery Bypass Graft Surgery, 257 JAMA 785, 789 (1987) ("[T]he greater skills of surgical
teams at higher-volume hospitals may be particularly necessary to care for patients undergoing
nonscheduled CABO surgery.").
48. See MLLENsoN, supra note 41, at 187,201.
49. See Arnold M. Epstein, Public Release of Performance Data: A Progress Report
From the Front, 283 JAMA 1884, 1885 (2000) (noting impact of report cards); Stephen F.
Jencks, Clinical Performance Measurement-A HardSell, 283 JAMA 2015 (2000); Daniel R.
Longo et al, Consumer Reports in Health Care: Do They Make a Difference in Patient Care?,
278 JAMA 1579 (1997); Eric C. Schneider & Arnold M Epstein, Influence of Cardiac-Surgery
Performance Reports on Referral Practices andAccess to Care: A Survey of Cardiovascular
Specialists, 335 NEW ENG. . MED. 251 (1996).
50. See MII.ElSoN, supra note 41, at 194; Chassin, supra not 13, at 586.
51. See MIIENSON, supra note 41, at 224.
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Private sector payors have spurred similar gains through selective con-
tracting. When Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield (Anthem) studied cardiac
surgery units in Ohio, it found a six-fold variation in risk-adjusted mortality
rates.52 Anthem reacted by excluding under-perforing hospitals from its
network.53 Once Anthem began steering its members to high-quality hospitals,
rates of death and other adverse outcomes fell, as did Anthem's costs.' Some
hospitals that were removed from Anthem's network also made dramatic turn-
arounds. After Anthem excluded Ohio State University Medical Center
(OSUMC) in 1995, OSUMC cut its risk-adjusted mortality in half and was
readmitted to the network in 1997.55
Anthem's experience shows that reputation is an unreliable predictor of
quality. The cardiac surgery unit at OSUMC, a teaching hospital, had an
excellent reputation, but Anthem's study showed that its performance was
sub-par. Another hospital, St. Elizabeth Medical Center in Edgewood, Ken-
tucky, was little known and had no particular reputation for quality of care.
Yet, St. Elizabeth's placed first on Anthem's CABG chart with a mortality
rate so low that officials at other hospitals initially refused to credit it. The
finding was neither a mistake nor a fluke. St. Elizabeth came in first in every
subsequent study. Until Anthem released its rankings, even St. Elizabeth's
own personnel did not fully appreciate its excellence.
The improvements in cardiac surgery described above did not come about
because providers spontaneously recognized that they were poor performers.
Nor did it occur because providers committed themselves to continuous quality
improvement (CQI). To the contrary, neither physicians nor hospitals made
any serious effort to compare the quality of care they were delivering with the
results being delivered by peer institutions. Nor did they adopt programs ofthe
kind employed by other businesses that are committed to CQI. Instead, provid-
ers all believed they were above average performers. This "Lake Wobegon"
effect was not dispelled until statistics showing enormous quality disparities
became available.56
52. See Thomas M. Burton, -MO Rates Hospitals; Many Don't Like 1* But They Get
Better, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22,1999, at Al, A13 (recounting efforts of Anthem to rate and selec-




56. See Garrison KeillorA Prairie Home Companion Monologue Excerpt (1997), avail-
able at http'//prairiehome.org/activities/chats_1997/100197_children_hearts.shtml ("That's the
news from Lake Wobegon, where all the women are strong, all the men are good-looking, and
all the children are above average.").
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Unfortunately, when providers learned the truth, the first instinct of many
was to "shoot the messenger."' In New York, cardiac surgeons tried to stop
the Department of Health from publishing risk-adjusted mortality rates. After
Newsday used a freedom of information request to obtain and publish doctor-
specific assessments, "[a]n angry Cardiac Advisory Committee promptly rec-
ommended that the state stop collecting information on individual doctors
altogether," arguing that such report cards would encourage physicians to turn
away the sickest patients."' The Medical Society of the State of New York
tried a different approach, warning "that patients may suffer psychologically
if they have to get treated by a surgeon with a higher than average mortality
rate" - although the medical society provided no evidence to suggest the
alleged psychological damage was more serious than the very real increase in
the likelihood of physical harm resulting from having a surgeon with a higher
than average mortality rate.59 Similar criticisms were made ofthe Pennsylva-
nia results. 6' When the New York Department of Public Health suggested
performance-based compensation for cardiac surgery, physicians and hospitals
pressured legislators to prohibit such arrangements.' When Anthem tried to
replicate its program in Kentucky, the Department of Insurance balked after
the Kentucky Hospital Association and some legislators objected. 2
Providers also tried to sidestep the import ofthese "report cards," arguing
that low scores were attributable to treating sicker patients and that risk adjust-
ments made to compensate for differences between patients were imperfect.63
Some providers even tried to "game" the system by reporting that their patients
were sicker (and thus at greater risk of dying) than they actually were.'
57. A similar process occurred with the U.S. News and World Reports ranking of law
schools. See Jan Hoffman, Judge No Law Schools Demand ofa Magazine thatRanks Them,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 19, 1998, at A5 (reporting that group of law school deans were sending out
letters to 93,000 law school applicants denouncing attempts to qualitatively rank law schools).
58. See MUJXNSON, supra note 41, at 193-96.
59. See id. at 198 (emphasis added).
60. See id. at214-15.
61. See id. at 196. The proposal is described in greater detail in Sarah Lyall, Proposal
Ties HospitalReimbursement o the Quality ofCare, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 25, 1992, at B1.
62. See Burton, supra note 52, atA13.
63. After Anthem made the results of its analysis available, every heart-surgery unit that
did poorly argued that it had experienced higher mortality because its patients were sicker.
Ohio thus manifested the first recorded instance of a "reverse-Lake Wobegon effect" Keillor,
supra note 56.
64. See MILLENSON, supra note 41, at 201. At one hospital, the reported frequency of
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease climbed from 1.8% to 52.98% after the public reports
began, and at another hospital, the reported frequency of angina went from 1.9% to 20.8%. Id.;
see also Joshua R- Barack et al., Public Reporting ofSurgicalMortality: A Survey ofNew York
State CardiothoracicSurgeons, 68ANNB THORACIC SURGERY 1195,1198 (1999) (document-
ing concern of cardiothoracic surgeons about "gaming" of reporting requirements).
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Despite these reactionary measures, disclosure-oriented regulatory strat-
egies triggered substantial quality improvements in New York and Pennsylva-
nia, and Anthem's selective contracting efforts had the same effect in Ohio.
Many states and employers are following this lead. They are experimenting
with "provider report cards," entering into exclusive contracts with "centers
of excellence," setting targets for selected preventive services, such as immu-
nizations, pap smears, and retinal exams for diabetics, and taking other steps
to measure quality.65
These efforts are all to the good, but we do not believe they will suf-
ficiently enhance the quality of care across the board. Volume-quality rela-
tionships exist for a wide variety of surgical interventions.' Experience from
other economic sectors indicates that current strategies (including regulatory
oversight, reporting of errors, selective contracting, and performance targets)
should be supplemented with direct economic incentives tied to performance.
In Part EI, we briefly describe prevailing compensation arrangements in the
medical sector and focus on their common shortcoming: the failure to link
compensation to performance.
II. Existing Arrangements for Compensating Health Care Providers
The health care sector encompasses a wide array ofproducts and services
delivered by more than a million providers during billions of patient encoun-
ters. Although insurance coverage and delivery arrangements vary widely, the
following four payment arrangements predominate: fee-for-service, flat-rate/
prospective payment, salary, and capitation.' Under a fee-for-service (FFS)
65. See MILLENSON, supra note 41, at 222 ("By the end of 1996, thirty-seven states had
medical data commissions, many of which were collecting and publishing some sort of quality
of care information.").
66. See HAROLD S. LUFr ET AL, HOSpIrAL VOLUM, PHYSICIAN VOLUME, AND PATIENT
OUTCOMES: ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE 103 fig. 5.1 (Health Admin. Press Perspectives 1990)
[hereinafter ASSESSING THE EVIDENcE]; Edward L. Hannan et aL,A Longitudinal Anawis of
the Relationship between In-Hospital Mortality in New YorkState and the Volume ofAbdomi-
nalAorticAneurysm SurgeriesPerformed,27 HEALTHSERV. RES. 517,535-36 (1992); Herbert
R. Karp etal, Carotid EndarterectomyAmongMedicare Beneficiaries: A Statewide Evaluation
ofAppropriateness and Outcome, 29 STROKE 46, 48 (1998) (finding that "[t]he mortality and
stroke rates [following carotid endarterectomies at] hospitals with a history of [10 or fewer
surgeries] per year was 2.6-fold higher than that at hospitals performing [50 or more]"); Samuel
0. Thier & Annetine C. Geljns, Improving Health: The Reason Performance Measurement
Matters, 17 HEALTHAFF. 26,26-27 (1998).
One recent study sought to quantify the potential benefit of improved referral practices.
The study determined that in California alone, more than 600 deaths in 1997 were attributable
to the fact that patients with conditions for which there was a volume-quality relationship were
treated at low volume hospitals. R. Adams Dudley et al., Selective Referral to High-Volume
Hospitals: EstimatingPotentialtyAvoidable Deaths, 283 JAMA 1159,1163 (2000).
67. To be sure, various forms of global outcome-driven payment arrangements have been
proposed by several commentators, but have made little headway. See generally KINDIG, supra
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system of compensation, providers are paid a fee for every incremental service
they provide. Until recently, this form of compensation prevailed throughout
most ofthe health care economy. Under a flat-rate/prospective system of com-
pensation, providers receive a set amount for each episode of care, regardless
of the actual expenses incurred. Under a salary system of compensation, pro-
viders' pay is unrelated to the volume, cost, and profitability of the services
they provide. Under a capitation system of compensation, providers receive
a set amount per patient per month to provide all required services.
Each arrangement has predictable strengths and weaknesses. FFS com-
pensation, which connects the amount paid to the nature and number of services
performed, encourages providers to be exhaustive in their work-ups and treat-
ments by providing them with income for every service they deliver. For the
same reason, FFS also leads to "upcoding," "churning," and the delivery of
services that, because they are inappropriate or unnecessary, wrongly expose
patients to significant costs and risks.'
Flat-rate/prospective payment, whichgives a provider a set amount for all
treatments relating to an illness or injury, discourages over-treatment during
a defined episode of care. The more services a provider delivers, the greater
the cost and the lower the profit. Unfortunately, flat-rate/prospective payment
rewards providers for reducing costs without regard to quality, thus encourag-
ing them to withhold services that patients truly need.
Salaries neither encourage providers to deliver services nor discourage
them from doing so. However, fixed salaries discourage diligence and pro-
ductivity, as physician management companies discovered to their dismay.69
Capitation arrangements, which pay amounts tied to the number of pa-
tients who enroll with particular providers regardless of any individual pa-
note 3 (suggesting that provider compensation should be tied to various benchmarks of public
health); Robin Hanson, Buy Health, Not Health Care, 14 CATO . 135 (1994) (suggesting that
patients buy life and disability insurance from their health care providers and contract with third
party who will pay to be beneficiary).
Interestingly, some forms of outcome-based compensation are employed by health care
providers in Cameroun. see Knm THL. LEONARD,AFRICAN TRADITIONALHLERs AND OuT-
colm-CoNTINGENT CONTRACTS iN HEALTH CARE (2000), available at httpi/www.columbia.
edu/-4d206/research.hnlm (describing and modeling use of outcome-contingent contracts).
Traditional Chinese physicians also were reported to enter into contracts with their patients so
that they were paid only during months in which their patients were well. Interview with Greg
Bloche, Professor, Georgetown University Law School.
68. See Kevin Grumbach et al.,Primary CarePhysicians'Experience ofFinanciallncen,
tives in Managed-Care Systems, 339 NEWENG. 1. MED. 1516 (1998); Audrey C. Kao et al., The
Relationship Between Method of Physician Payment and Patient Trust, 280 J.AMA 1708
(1998); Stephen M. Shortell et al., Physicians as DoubleAgents: Maintaining Trust in an Era
ofMultipleAccountabilities, 280 JAMA 1102,1103 (1998).
69. See Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Rise and Fall of the Physician Practice Management
Indusy, 19 HEALTHAFF. 42 (2000) (recounting catastrophic consequences of failing to address
physician non-productivity once physicians are on fixed salaries).
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tient's health care needs, promote a population-based perspective on health
care. Unfortunately, they also generate a variety of problematic behaviors,
including "red-lining" of patients with chronic illnesses and under-provision
of routine services.
Hybrids of these compensation arrangements attempt to combine the best
aspects of the pure types while minimizing the impact of the bad incentives,
but their success remains to be seen." Enthusiasts of any given compensation
arrangement are quick to condemn the competing alternatives. 1
For present purposes, the critical feature that all four arrangements share
is the failure to tie compensation to quality of service or to patients' health.
All four arrangements are quality- and outcome-independent. They link
compensation to variables (e.g., the amount of time a provider spends with a
patient, the number of patients a provider treats, the number and type of
procedures a provider performs, the number of weeks a provider is employed,
or the number of patients in a provider's practice) that neither correspond to
nor correlate strongly with patients' desires. 2 Consequently, current payment
schemes fhil to align the interests ofpatients and providers as closely as would
result-based payment systems.
Compensation arrangements that link payments to process-based consid-
erations that do not correlate with outcome, such as the number of non-pre-
70. SeeJamesC. Robinson, BlendedPaymentMethodsinPhysician Organizations Under
Managed Care, 282 JAMA 1258 (1999) (describing use of blended payment stratagics); Neil
Schlackman Evolution ofaQuality-Based CompensationModel: The ThirdGeneration,8 MED.
QUAMY 103 (1993) (describing evolution of quality-based compensation model).
71. See Mark D. Smith, Managed Care and the Poor, 5 3. HEALTH CARE POOR UNDER-
SERVED 147,150 (1994) (stating that "nothing is worse than fee-for-service").
72. Indeed, the mechanism of payment can affirmatively frustrate patient preferences. For
example, it appears that many women receive open surgical breast biopsies instead of core-
needle biopsies, even though the latter is less traumatic and does not require general anesthesia,
because physicians are better paid for the former. See Barbara Martinez, How Insurance Pay-
ments Can WorkAgainst Less-Invasive Biopsies, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2001, at B1 ("The way
doctors are paid often encourages the use of older, more expensive and sometimes riskier
medical procedures when better options exist Medicare, for example, pays a physician about
$400 to do a surgical biopsy in a hospital, but only $128 to do a core-needle biopsy."). Given
this economic differential, it is not all that surprising that almost 80% of the 1.2 million Medi-
care beneficiaries who required breast biopsies underwent surgery. See id.
A similar situation may well apply to the incentive for an obstetrician to perform a
Cesarean section, instead of allowing the women to deliver vaginally. See Jonathan Gruber &
Maria Owings, Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section Delivery, 27 RAND 3.
EcON. 99 (1996); Emmett B. Keeler & Mollyann Brodie, Economic Incentives in the Choice
Between VaginalDeliveryand CesareanSection, 71 MIuANKQ. 365 (1993) (suggesting higher
payment for Cesarean section might provide incentives for physicians to provide more Cesarean
sections). But see Emmett B. Keeler & Thomas Fok, Equalizing Physician Fees Had Little
Effect on Cesarean Rates, 53 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 465 (1996) (finding very little effect on
Cesarean section frequency from equalization of payment for Cesarean and vaginal deliveries).
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ventative services delivered, can be particularly pernicious because they
become increasingly counterproductive overtime. As knowledge and technol-
ogy change, these criteria become inaccurate signals of quality. Suppose that
a third party payor offers a provider $100 every time the provider performs
procedure Xand that it costs the provider $80 in time and resources to provide
X. Because the provider makes $20 per procedure, he always has an incentive
to deliverX (unless other procedures are even more profitable). Now suppose
that new studies reveal that procedure X, once thought to help patients consid-
erably, really has little value for them. The profit motive will still encourage
the provider to deliverX. Suppose further that the provider learns that service
Y, which also costs $80 to perform but for which the payor is offering only
$85, is an effective substitute for X 3 The provider will be better off deliver-
ing Xdespite the superiority of Y."4
Because information and technology change rapidly in the health care
business, it is important to give providers incentives to keep up with the medi-
cal literature and to make diagnoses and treatment decisions based on the best
available evidence. Unfortunately, payors (i.e., health insurers, MCOs, em-
ployers, Medicaid, and Medicare) have adopted compensation arrangements
that effectively pay providers the same amount, whether they deliver high
quality care or not. No effort has been made to use economic incentives to
give providers "in the trenches" appropriate micro-incentives. Indeed, exist-
ing compensation arrangements frequently create incentives that discourage
the delivery of high quality care. 5
73. Strictly speaking, it is not necessary for our example that Y be superior to Xin qual-
ity - merely that it be cheaper, while providing equivalent benefits.
74. See MILENSON, supra note 41, at 274-75. For example, doctors can treat urinary
tract infections (UTIs) in women by requiring office visits or by having nurses interview
patients and prescribe antibiotics over the phone. The latter procedure works just as well and
saves seventy percent of the cost Yet, if compensation requires face-to-face contact with a
physician, providers who offer such alternatives will suffer financially. Id. at 276. Doctors can
treat viral upper respiratory infections, such as the common cold, with office visits and antibiot-
ics or allow them to follow their natural course. The latter is far cheaper than the former but
qualitatively no worse. Doctors can order MRI scans for back pain sufferers or send them home
to rest. Most often, the pain will disappear by itself whichever option is chosen, but the cost
differs greatly. The problem is pervasive - uncertainty about obtaining compensation has
discouraged physicians from using e-mail to communicate with patients, despite substantial
demand for this mode ofinteraction.
75. See INST. OF MED., supra note 1, at 191-93 (providing several examples of perverse
incentives created by existing compensation arrangements); MLLENSON, supra note 41, at 274-
81 (detailing adverse financial impact on providers of adopting cost-effective treatment patterns
that better served their patients: "[T]he better the clinic got at practicing cost-efficient medicine,
the emptier its waiting room became"); Regina Herzlinger, A Better Way to Pay, MODERN
HEALTHCARE, Dec. 11, 2000, at 32 (outlining consequences of integrated program for treatment
of congestive heart failure at Duke University Hospital: "Per patient costs declined by 28%,
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These problems on the "delivery side" of the market are compounded by
the institutional arrangements through which health care is financed. Insured
patients pay for relatively fei services out-of-pocket, and third-party payors
have historically paid more attention to the cost of care than to its quality7 6
Employers who offer health care coverage have some incentive to ensure that
the quality of care is sufficient to maintain employee productivity and mini-
mize turn-over, but they are still less interested in quality than employees
would rationally want them to be. Federal, state, and local governments, which
account for 45% of total health care expenditures, face similar conflicts be-
tween the interests of taxpayers, program administrators, providers, and
program beneficiaries." In general, third-party payors neither capture the full
benefits of high quality care nor suffer the full consequences of low quality
care. They are accordingly less than perfect agents when it comes to balancing
quality and cost.78
Individual patients frequently have difficulty assessing quality of care.
Patients may know whether providers make them wait too long before seeing
them or returning their phone calls, but they have much more difficulty telling
whether providers diagnose andtreattheir problems correctly. Patients' efforts
to assess quality are also hampered by the dearth of information about provid-
ers' relative performance. 9 Because patients cannot easily detect quality
largely because improvements in health status reduced the need for costly hospital stays. But
the Duke system took a financial hit After all, insurers pay for hospital stays, not improving
the cost-effectiveness of healthcare.").
76. See JAcK MEYEP ET AL, THEORY AND REALrrY oF VALUE-BASED PURCHASING 4
(Nov. 1997), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/meyerrpt.htm ("[Tihe majority of employ-
ers around the country - particularly smaller firms - arc mainly concerned with cost control.
Their major emphasis is placed on obtaining assurances from health plans that their premium
increases will be held to a minimum - or even that premiums will decline. How that is achieved
is of little interest to these employers."); see also INST. OF MED., supra note 5, at 3 ("Group pur-
chasers have made few demands for improvements in safety. Most third party payment systems
provide little incentive for a health care organization to improve safety, nor do they recognize
and reward safety or quality."); Jane E. Sisk, Increased Competition and the Quality of Health
Care, 76 MIBANK Q. 687, 687 (1998) (observing that proponents of increased competition in
medical sector are primarily concerned with costs).
77. See David A. Hyman, What's Wrong with a PatientBill ofRight, 73 S. CAL. L. REV.
221,235-36, 245-53 (1999) (detailing agency problems with purchasing and regulating health
care coverage). This difficulty also applies when the government seeks to regulate the coverage
market. Legislative opportunism is common, as most of the costs are off-budget, and mandates
frequently have more to do with the political power of the affected groups and the saliency of
the issue to the public than the cost-effectiveness of the specified treatments. See id.
78. See id.
79. Until New York and Pennsylvania started collecting and disseminating risk-adjusted
mortality and morbidity rates for CABO, consumers had no way of telling which doctors and
cardiac surgery units were the best performers. Consequently, patients could not have selected
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differences between competing insurance plans, they shop on the basis of
price. This motivates insurers and MCOs to set the cost-quality equilibrium
at a different spot than patients would rationally demand were they perfectly
informed. To summarize, the institutional arrangements through which health
care is financed and delivered have made it more difficult for patients to
obtain the quality of care they desire and for which they are willing to pay.
IV The Case for RBCAs
In most sectors of the economy, RBCAs are routinely used to address
agency problems, including issues relating to quality. However, in the medical
marketplace, RBCAs are almost never employed. Instead, payors use other sig-
nals and mechanisms, including character, professional socialization, reputa-
tional interests, disclosure requirements, and legal liability, to motivate agents
to perform well and to make desirable cost/quality tradeoffs. The anomalous
reliance on mechanisms that do not tie compensation to results has failed to
give patients what they want: high quality care that is reasonably priced.80
a provider based on quality no matter how badly they wanted to. They had to rely on referring
doctors to steer them to high quality providers. Patients could not readily discover that referring
doctors were sending them to inferior specialists.
80. In principle, any system for imposing costs on providers who offer low quality care,
such as malpractice liability or regulatory sanctions, could substitute for RBCAs. We note that
the American health care system currently employs malpractice liability and regulatory sanc-
tions, but, as outlined in Part IL the quality consequences are less than impressive. Indeed,
because malpractice liability and regulatory sanctions rely on "shame and blame" strategies, they
can'be counter-productive in that they drive underground those with the information required
to enhance quality. In addition, the absolute performance of the malpractice system is less than
impressive. See generally PAULWE.EREBT AL.,A MEASUR OF MALPRACTICE (Harv. U. Press
1990) (concluding that medical malpractice litigation infrequently compensates patients injured
by medical negligence and rarely holds providers accountable for substandard care); A.
Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adver eEvents Due to Negligence:
Results of the Harvard Medical Malpractice Study 11, 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 245 (1991);
David M. Studdert et al., Negligent Care and Malpractice Claiming Behavior in Utah and
Colorado, 38 MED. CARE 250 (2000). To be fair, the number ofinjuries from medical treatment
is so large (and the incidence of negligence is sufficiently modest) that even with quite effective
screening criteria, many cases are likely to be pursued in which there was no negligence. See
Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation Sys-
tem -And Why Not? 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1147,1193-96 (1992).
In theory, non-punitive mechanisms within the medical profession, such as continuing
medical education and treatment guidelines, could also be an effective response to these prob-
lems. Unfortunately, empirical research studying the effectiveness of these interventions is not
particularly encouraging. See David A. Davis et al., Changing Physician Performance: A Sys-
tematic Review of the Effect of Continuing Medical Education Strategies, 274 JAMA 700
(1995) (noting failure of widely used continuing medical education methods to influence prac-
lice); Jacqueline Kosecoff et al, Effects of the NationalInstitutes ofHealth Consensus Develop-
mentProgram on Physician Practice, 258 JAMA2708 (1987) (noting failure ofNIH consensus
conferences to influence treatment patterns).
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Given the absence of result-based compensation, it is not surprising that
the quality of health care varies greatly and is often unacceptably poor. Econ-
omists typically assume that people act out of self-interest. The assumption
both exaggerates and oversimplifies, butit accurately predicts how mostpeople
facing economic incentives will act most of the time. When confronting risks,
most people purchase insurance and diversify their investment portfolios.
Most people prefer more income to less and seek to minimize their taxes.
When a product is heavily taxed or outlawed, substitutes, smugglers, and black
markets emerge.
8'
Economists also assume that health care providers, like everyone else, are
influenced by self-interest. For this reason, they would expect compensation
methods to influence providers' treatment recommendations and practice pat-
terns. Empirical research generally confirms this prediction. 2 For example,
after Medicare abandoned cost-based per-diem reimbursement and moved to
prospective payment based on discharge diagnosis, hospital lengths-of-stay
declined precipitously. 3 In addition, physicians who own X-ray.machines or
possess financial stakes in clinical laboratories order many more X-rays and
many more laboratory tests than other physicians.U On the other hand,
81. See ADAM SMrH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 362 (J.M. Dent & Sons 1930) (1776)
("The high duties which have been imposed upon the importation of many different sorts of
foreign goods, in order to discourage their consumption in Great Britain, have in many cases
served only to encourage smuggling, and in all cases have reduced the revenue of the customs
below what more moderate duties would have afforded. The saying of Dr. Swift that in the
arithmetic of the customs two and two, instead of making four, make sometimes only one holds
perfectly true with regard to such heavy duties.").
82. See generally Fred J. Hellinger, The Impact of Financial Incentives on Physician
Behavior inManaged CarePlans: A Review of the Evidence, 53 MED. CARE. RES. & REV. 294
(1996); Alan L. Hillman et aL, How Do Financial Incentives Affect Physicians Clinical
Decisions and The Financial Performance of Health Maintenance Organizations?, 321 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 86 (1989) (concluding that certain financial incentives influence behavior of
physicians); James C. Robinson, Theory and Practice in the Design of Physician Payment
Incentives, 79 MnIBANK Q. 149 (2001) (examining impact of financial incentives on physician
behavior); Peter R. Kongstvedt & Kathryn E. Martin, A Review of the Past Decade's Research
on the Effect of Financial Incentives on Physician Behavior in Managed Health Care (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with authors) (summarizing research on effect of financial incentives
on physician behavior). But see R. Adams Dudley et aL, The Impact of Financial Incentives
on Quality of Health Care, 76 MU.LANK Q. 649, 654 (1998) ("Linking salaries and bonuses to
performance on quality measures is common in other industries. In the health care industry,
however, this practice has been rare until recently and has not been well studied.").
83. See Robert H. Brook et al., Health System Reform and Quality, 276 JAMA476, 479
(1996) (noting immediate 25% decline in length of stay following introduction of prospective
payment); David A. Hyman & Joel V. Williamson, Fraud andAbuse: RegulatoryAlternatives
in a 'Competitive' Health Care Environment, 19 LoY. U. CHL L.J. 1133, 1139 n.41 (1988)
(noting impact of prospective payment system on hospital length-of-stay).
84. See Chassin, supra note 13, at 570.
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physicians whose compensation is inversely tied to the cost of the services
they deliver are more parsimonious when it comes to hospitalizations and
ancillary services and complain about budgetary pressures to limit referrals
and see more patients.8" Because economic considerations influence treatment
patterns, it is important to give providers financial incentives to deliver high-
quality care.
A. Patient Preferences and RBCAs
"Desirable health care outcomes depend on what patients desire.186 What
patients want is not always altogether clear because different people make
different tradeoffs between quality, cost, and access. Yet, it is obvious that
patients are rarely enthusiastic about "bad" health outcomes. At any given
expenditure level, it is safe to assume that patients prefer better health to
poorer health, and desirable outcomes to undesirable ones. It is also a safe
assumption that although there is some uncertainty, patients tend to agree
about which outcomes are good and which are bad.' Death, for example, is
usually a valid indicator of an undesirable outcome.
In the current medical marketplace, patients attempt to satisfy the desire
for better health mainly by searching for high quality providers. Diligent
patients ask whether providers care about the same things they do, and use a
variety of search criteria, including reputation, credentials, and personal
rapport, to identify providers who are likely to perform well.s After a provider
85. See Hellinger, supra note 82, at 294 (reviewing impact of economic incentives on
physician behavior); Robert Miller & Harold S. LuA, Managed Care Plan Performance Since
1980, 271 JAMA 1512 (1994) (comparing health care utilization, expenditure, quality of care,
and satisfaction in managed care and indemnity plans since 1980). But see Brian Hutchison
et al., Do Physician-Payment Mechanisms Affect Hospital Utilization? A Study of Health
Service Organizations in Ontario, 154 CAN. MED.Assoc. 3. 653 (1996) (finding no impact on
hospital utilization from introduction of capitation with incentive payment for low hospital
utilization rate).
86. Thier & Gelijns, supra note 66, at 26-27; see also Paul D. Cleary & Susan Edman-
Levitan, Health Care Quality: Incorporating Consumer Perspectives, 278 JAMA 1608 (1997)
(addressing most important health care quality gaps and challenges from perspective of con-
sumer).
87. The literature on shared decision-making in health care suggests that patient prefer-
ences must be factored into the assessment of desirable and undesirable outcomes. See Shared
Decision Making, available at http'/www.www.dartmouthatlas.org/shareddecisionmaking/sdm
_l.php (last visited Jan. 11, 2002).
88. The requirement for "informed consent" encourages providers to disclose information
and patients to participate in decision-making. Unfortunately, the empirical evidence is quite
clear that the requirement for informed consent generally fails to ensure the provision of
adequate information to patients. See Charles H. Braddock et al, Informed Decision Making
in Outpatient Practice: Time to Get Back to Basics, 282 JAMA 2313 (1999) (detailing short-
comings in informed consent practices).
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is chosen, a patient can encourage superior service mainly by monitoring,
hoping, and, in an extreme case, threatening to sue. However, because many
patients are unsophisticated and lack the data needed to search and monitor
providers effectively, the current approach does not work particularly well.
In the rest ofthe economy, consumers who desire quality services supple-
ment other techniques with RBCAs. Consider the market for legal services.
Although injured claimants look for lawyers with good reputations and monitor
them after engaging them, they also use standardized contingent fees to encour-
age plaintiffs' attorneys to perform well. Contingent fees prevail inthis market
for several reasons. First, injured claimants seek benefits thathavethe potential
to vary, namely awards of cash or needed services. Structurally, these benefits
resemble a stream of cooled air that is regulated by a thermostat. Clients care
whether the system is running and what temperature is achieved.' Contingent
compensation encourages a lawyer to obtain the flow of benefits that a client
wants by tying the lawyer's fee to a client's recovery, so that the more the
client recovers, the more the lawyer earns. Obviously, this assumes that the
quality and quantity of lawyers' exertions strongly influence the value of
claims. When lawyers cannot affect either the likelihood of good outcomes or
an outcomes' "goodness," contingent compensation is pointless because the
result will be what it will be regardless of what the lawyer does. One might as
well offer a weather forecaster a bonus tied to the number of sunny days.
The limited potential for benefits to vary explains why there is no contin-
gent fee market for wills, trusts, securities filings, leases, title abstracts, or
other standard products of lawyering. Clients pay for services like these bythe
hour or by the project.89 The ABA's Model Code reinforces this pattern; inthe
absence of outcome-related risk, these rules prohibit a lawyer from charging
a contingent fee when a client can afford to pay for services on another basis.'
Second, personal injury clients cannot easily determine whether their
attorneys are using good judgment or exerting optimal effort. Unlike liability
insurance companies and other commercial entities that routinely deal with
lawyers, these clients tend to be unsophisticated, one-shot purchasers of legal
services. Consequently, they have little ability to determine whether lawyers
are "diagnosing" and "treating" their legal problems correctly.
89. This is not to deny that the quality of standard products can and does vary. Some
lawyers are better at drafting wills or contracts than others, and any lawyer can do a better job
or a poorer one on a given assignment The point is just that the present value of the potential
variance in benefits is too small to justify contingent compensation. It is more efficiently dealt
with in other ways, such as by careful choice of attorneys, by payment of higher prices for more
talented lawyers with better reputations, and by use of malpractice remedies.
90. SeeMODELCODEOFPROF'LRESPONSmIIrYEC2-20(1983),ABACoMM.ONETHICS
& PROF'L RESPONSiBH=rY, FORMAL OP. 94-389 (1994) ("[A] lawyer generally should decline
to accept employment on a contingent fee basis by one who is able to pay a reasonable fixed
fee.").
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RBCAs make clients' ignorance less ofan issue by shifting part of the risk
of failure to attorneys. By accepting a contingent fee, a lawyer sends a client
two important messages: that the case has solid potential and that the lawyer
can be trusted to handle it well. Were either message false, the lawyer would
suffer financially. The lawyer also gains credibility by voluntarily incurring
a penalty for exercising poor judgment or slacking. Neither message is sent
when a lawyer's compensation is guaranteed. Why trust a lawyer's evaluation
of a claim when the lawyer will be paid win or lose? Why trust a lawyer's
recommendation to incur litigation-related expenses, such as to take a deposi-
tion, or to assume certain risks, such as proceeding to trial instead of settling,
when the lawyer has nothing at stake? Why expect a lawyer to exert optimal
effort when, regardless of the actual effort level, the lawyer is paid the same
rate?
Sophisticated clients typically place little value on these messages, so they
rarely offer lawyers straight contingent fees. For example, insurance carriers
pay lawyers hourly rates, fixed fees, and salaries because they are good at
assessing quality and monitoring effort levels and because they can use the
possibility of withholding future business to encourage good performance.91
Consequently, sophisticated clients use RBCAs less often when dealing with
lawyers, and when they do, they employ hybrids that combine guaranteed pay-
ments with small contingent bonuses instead of using straight contingent fees.
Also, because commercial clients are sophisticated, the referral market on the
defense side of personal injury cases is moribund while the market on the
plaintiffs' side is robust. Insurance carriers do not need to pay lawyer-brokers
to select specialists for them because they know excellent lawyers in every
field.
Third, money is a signal that correlates reasonably well with the quality
of legal services andthat resists manipulation. Because money is a determinate
commodity, injured clients and plaintiffs' attorneys can easily assess and verify
the quality of the result. Moreover, because both clients and lawyers prefer
more money to less, neither can easily manipulate the other strategically.
Lawyers and clients are hardly alone in using money as a proxy for qual-
ity of service. Employers measure results with the same yardstick when com-
pensating salespeople who work on commission. High sales volumes yield
high sales commissions. Shareholders gauge the performance of managers in
the same terms. High stock prices mean that warrants and stock options given
as compensation are worth more. Homeowners and real estate agents also tie
91. See Robert E. Litan & Steven C. Salop, Reforming the Lawyer-Client Relationship
Through Alternative Billing Methods, 77 JUDICATURE 191 (1994) (discussing importance of
billing arrangements to lawyer-client relationship); Charles Silver, Flat Fees and StaffAttor-
neys: Unnecessary Casualties in the Continuing Battle over the Law Governing Insurance
Defense Lawyers, 4 CoNN. INS. LJ. 205 (1997-1998) (describing relationships between insurers
and defense lawyers).
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performance to money. The absolute size of a real estate agent's commission
depends not only on whether a home is sold, but also on the price at which it
changes hands.
Money is often the most convenient determinant of whether an agent
exerted a superior effort, but it is hardly the only one. Some markets have
developed highly specialized signals of performance. An employer may tie a
professional athlete's compensation to the number ofminutes or games played,
the number of points scored or rebounds collected, batting average, extra-base
hits, error-free innings, completed passes, yards rushed, or unassisted tackles.
In establishing a professor's raise, a law school may consider the number of
articles published, the caliber of the journals in which the article appeared, or
scores earned on student evaluations. Parents may base a child's allowance on
the satisfactory performance of chores. A parent may keep paying college tui-
tion only as long as their child's GPA exceeds a specified figure.
No measure of outcome tracks service quality precisely, because out-
comes depend on many factors, only one of which is an agent's effort level.
Thus, a lawyer can provide top-flight representation and still lose a case. A
surgeon can use all the care and skill in the world, yet still lose a patient. A
hard-working student may get sick during final exams or take a class with a
professor who distributes grades randomly. A lazy student may get a lucky
break and be tested on solely the small fiaction of material he actually read.
Agents can also manipulate signals to make their effort levels look higher
than they are. When money is the signal, agents may "cook the books" to make
their performance seem better than it really was. Principals routinely insist on
independent auditors to address this particular problem. When other signals
are chosen, manipulation can still occur. Sportscasters accused Moses Malone,
the center for the Philadelphia Seventy-Sixers, of missing easy put-backs inten-
tionally so as to generate additional rebound opportunities and pad his num-
bers. Lazy students have been known to take easy classes to keep their grade
point averages high. Principals routinely use signals that, although inexact, are
the best tools available for giving agents incentive and that, despite their
deficiencies, are good enough to make RCBAs better than other compensation
arrangements.
Given the conditions under which RBCAs are useful, the health care
sector appears to be a potentially fruitful field for their application. First,
health care outcomes have enormous potentialto vary. Risk-adjusted mortality
rates for particularprocedures varyhugelyacross providers, drug-related errors
occur far more often in some hospitals than others, and vicious nosocomial
infections beset some surgical patients but not others. To some extent, provid-
ers control these variations.92 Doctors and cardiac surgery units with higher
92. See, e.g., MLLENSON, supra note 41, at 188 ("A revealing study of intensive care
units at thirteen sophisticated hospitals across the country illustrated the critical role played by
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CABG volumes have lower mortality rates. Hospitals with fewer drug-related
errors use computerized prescription tracking systems. Patients who avoid
post-operative infections are protected by superior sanitary procedures and
treated by hospital personnel who take extra precautions. Providers control
many of the variables that determine how well patients fare.
Second, most patients cannot monitor providers' performance very well,
for the same reasons that most claimants cannot evaluate the performance of
personal injury lawyers. Providers receive lengthy educations, enjoy consider-
able on the job experience, and specialize in narrow practice areas. Patients
have neither the training nor the data to monitor their conduct effectively.
Patients cannot assess the accuracy of providers' diagnoses, the wisdom of
providers' treatment recommendations, or make inter-provider comparisons to
ensure that their treatment reflects the changing state of the art.
Third, many health outcomes can be measured objectively and in ways
that resist manipulationbyproviders and patients. Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate
that outcomes can be measured with morbidity and mortality rates. Death is
particularly hard to fake and is generally viewed as undesirable. To be sure,
the most serious practical impediment to the development and implementation
ofRBCAs is the identification ofadequate performance indicators, either alone
or m combination with other signals that are now employed. If suitable out-
come indicators are developed and employed, the prospect of simultaneously
enhancing quality, lowering cost; and broadening access -the holy grail (ifnot
the holy trinity) of health care policy - will be within reach.'
We will say far more about outcome measures below. For now, we wish
to make a few general, analytical points. First, good outcome measures tied to
rewards will automatically encourage providers to implement new knowledge
for the benefit of patients. As the state of medical knowledge evolves to make
it possible to offer higher quality at lower cost; RBCAs will encourage provid-
ers to adapt their practice patterns accordingly. Previously, we used an exam-
well-coordinated care. All the ICUs had similar technical capabilities, but there was a frighten-
ing difference in mortality rates. Patients at the best ICU had a 41% greater chance of surviving
than would have been predicted, given how sick they were before treatment, while patients at
the worst hospital had a 58% greater chance of dying than would be expected. What caused this
yawning gap was not technology, but 'the interaction and communication between physicians
and nurses."); J. Chen et al.,Do 'America 's Best Hospitals" Perform Betterfor Acute Myocar-
dial Infarction?, 340 NEW ENG. . MED. 286 (1999) (concluding that admission to hospital that
is ranked high on list of America's best hospitals is associated with lower thirty-day mortality
rate among elderly with myocardial infarction); Hannan, supra note 43, at 1677; D. R. Thiemann
et al, The Association Between Hospital Volume and Survival after Acute Myocardial Infarc-
ion in Elderly Patients, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1640 (1999) (determining that patients with
acute myocardial infarction who are admitted directly to hospitals with more experience, mea-
sured by case volume, are more likely to survive).
93. This Article focuses on quality and, to a lesser extent, on cost. The issue of access
lies beyond the scope of this piece, but we expect to address it in a future article.
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pie involving procedureXto show that FFS compensation discourages efficient
adaptations. When it was discovered that procedureXwas not beneficial, FFS
encouraged the doctorto keep providing it. When it was learned that procedure
Y was a good substitute forX, FFS did not encourage the doctor to switch.
A well-designed RBCA would reduce the need for patients to monitor
doctors by automatically rewarding doctors for using new information to
patients' advantage. Continuing the example, suppose that instead of paying
a flat fee for any particular service, a third party payor offered a $20 profit on
any service that cured a patient identified as having problem Q. Once it became
clear that procedure Xhad little or no value for these patients, doctors would
automatically stop providing it. They would neither earn a profit nor even
recover their costs. When studies showed that procedure Y did help these
patients, doctors would immediately switch. Doctors also would shift fromX
to Y if both procedures were equally effective but Y required less time to
deliver. A $20 profit earned in fifteen minutes is better than a $20 profit earned
in an hour.
Second, RBCAs cannot align the interests of principals and agents per-
fectly. No compensation formula that divides marginal returns on effort be-
tween a principal and an agent can accomplish this feat. Fortunately, RBCAs
do not have to be perfect to be desirable. They just have to be better than the
alternatives that are available inthe real world. Because existing compensation
arrangements are seriously deficient, there is every reason to experiment with
RBCAs.
Third, the search for outcome measures should reflect the point just made.
No outcome-based performance measure will signal quality and effort levels
perfectly. Every proxy will have an associated error factor. Even money re-
flects effort imprecisely. However, insofar as principals and agents are con-
cerned, money is good enough because tying compensation to money, be it the
amount recovered on a claim or the value of items sold, is better than paying
on some other basis. The same is true in the health care sector. All conceiv-
able outcome measures signal quality of service and effort levels imprecisely.
Consequently, patients will bear some risks that should rest with doctors, and
doctors will bear some risks that should rest with patients. Even so, RBCAs
will be preferable to existing compensation arrangements if providers are more
strongly motivated to use their knowledge and abilities to help patients. In
health care, as in so many other places, it is important to remember that the
perfect can be the enemy of the good.
B. Provider SocialNorms and RBCAs
The dismal findings described in Part II demonstrate that existing institu-
tional arrangements for delivering health care create insufficient incentives for
providers to monitor and improve quality levels. The flurry of safety initiatives
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that followed on the heels of the 1999 IOM report, To Err Is Human,9 4 was a
salutary development but nothing prevented health care providers from
adopting these programs or from embracing CQI before the report came out.
Nor does anything ensure that the new safety measures will be effective in the
long run, that better measures will be implemented as technologies improve,
or that providers will make a commitment to safety part of their institutional
cultures. To the contrary, the history of initiatives to improve quality and
eradicate medical errors should lead one to fear that the noted "cycle of inac-
tion" will continue. The press of competing commitments and opposition from
eritrenched interests may well undermine the good intentions created by the
IOM reports on quality.
Attacking quality problems requires commitment, hard work, and sub-
stantial resources. An enterprise must perceive a significant upside potential
or a serious downside risk before it will "bite the bullet" and make needed
investments in quality and patient safety. In most markets for goods and
services, competition motivates producers to make cost-justified improve-
ments. A "near-death" experience at the hands of competitors is a remarkably
effective tool for disciplining producers who lose sight of consumers' needs."
Because competition on quality grounds in the health care sector is greatly
attenuated, relatively few substandard providers suffer "near-death" experi-
ences, Providers that experience financial troubles usually do so for reasons
that have nothing to do with the quality of care. Skepticism about the ability
of competitive forces to remedy quality deficiencies is so pervasive that one
commentator even suggested using enterprise liability to create "near-death
experiences" for providers that under-perform. 6
When providers do face up to quality problems, they frequently respond
with cosmetic changes. Why put a whole hospital on CQI when replacing the
head of an under-performing CABG unit will keep the press at bay? Even




95. See David Blumenthal & Charles M. Kilo, A Report Card on Continuous Qualiy
Improvement, 76 MnBANK Q. 625, 638 (1998) (noting impact of near-death experiences on
providers in other markets).
96. See Clark HavighurstMakingHealth PlansAccountable for the Quality of Care, 31
GA. L. REV. 587-647 (1997). Not all commentators express this degree of skepticism. Some
suggest that managed care organizations (MCOs) can encourage providers to improve by re-
warding those who offer high quality care at reasonable prices. See, e.g., Charles K. Buck, Jr.,
Health Care through aSixSigmaLens, 76 MUiBANKQ. 749,750 (1998) ("In today's health care
industry, the closest equivalent to a near death experience may be for a provider or plan to see
its customers shifting to another organization because of differences in quality."). In practice,
however, most MCOs have emphasized cost, rather than quality, when assessing providers.
97. Blumenthal & Kilo, supra note 95, at 635 ("A survey of experts found that none could
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There is broad agreement that quality will improve only when providers'
attitudes and social norms change. "moo few physicians and administrators
believe that our clinical care is broadly deficient or that we need a fundamen-
tal reexamination of the infrastructure, organization, and processes of care. 's9
The response of one CABG provider to Anthem's decision to stop sending it
patients is typical. When Anthem communicated its decision, hospital admin-
istrators reportedly shot back, "Do you know how many articles we had
published last year in the New England Journal ofMedicine?" The adminis-
trators and physicians obviously cared about quality; they just did not think
about it in the same terms as their patients. Similarly, after New York and
Pennsylvania issued CABG mortality reports, doctors continued to refer
patients to low-quality providers.1" At best, this bespeaks a fundamental
disjunction between the standards referring physicians actually were employ-
ing and the standards they would have employed had they put themselves in
their patients' shoes. At worst, it shows that referring doctors were indifferent
to the quality of care delivered by surgeons performing CABG.
The strongest evidence of the severity of agency problems and the need
for attitudinal changes is the persistence of both medical errors and wide-
spread deviations from appropriate standards of care. If providers truly were
committed to quality, they would have transformed their industry long ago, as
anesthetists did in the 1980s and as some CABG providers did during the past
ten years.
The problem of incentives to deliver care of poor quality is not limited
to the contexts identified in Part III, but it also is manifested in providers'
willingness to offer unproven treatments. Federal regulations require pharma-
ceutical companies to prove that their products are safe and effeotive before
marketing them, but medical and surgical treatments are not subject to similar
oversight. "New and improved treatments" can and do spread like wildfire
because the medical profession frequently accepts innovations uncritically and
identify a health care organization that has fundamentally improved its performance through
CQI (or any other means). There simply are no organization-wide success stories out there -
no shining castles on the hill to serve as inspirations for a struggling industry .... The basic
principles of CQI have yet to diffuse deeply through most health care organizations, and they
have not usually made any inroads into the clinical side, where most physicians remain ignorant
and/or skeptical of them."); Shortell et al., supra note 16, at 594 ("A national survey of U.S.
hospitals in 1993 found that 69% had adopted and were beginning to implement some form of
CQI program; of these, 75% had done so only within the previous two years. Most of these
applications, however, have been in administrative areas, such as patient scheduling, record
keeping, billing, and related management functions. Only in the past three or four years has
there been any systematic application to clinical practice.").
98. Berwick, supra note 35; Molly Joel Coye & Don E. Detmer, Quality ata Crossroads,
76MdI.BANKQ. 759,762 (1998).
99. See Burton, supra note 52, at Al.
100. See Schneider & Epstein, supra note 49.
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because individual providers have considerable discretion in their treatment
decisions.' 10 Once a "new and improved" treatment becomes a widely used
method of care, insurers are under tremendous pressure to pay for it, whether
or not it really is better than pre-existing treatments and whether or not it is
cost-justified.
Unproven medical treatments expose patients to a variety of risks, in-
cluding but not limited to the risk that the treatment will not work. Consider
a recent example: high dose chemotherapy followed by autologous bone mar-
row transplant (HDC-ABMT) as a treatment for metastatic breast cancer.
HDC-ABMT is highly invasive, painful, dangerous, and expensive. After
some preliminary studies suggested it might be an effective "last-resort" treat-
ment for metastatic breast cancer, a significant number of oncologists began
offering it. Although insurers argued that HDC-ABMT was an experimental
treatment, prominent oncologists asserted that its effectiveness was proved
and that it had become the accepted treatment. Courts routinely ordered
insurers to pay for the procedure, and state legislatures enacted bills requiring
coverage of it. In relatively short order, many insurers simply began covering
HDC-ABMT, despite the lack of evidence supporting the treatment and the
enornous expense."°
In the 1990s, tens ofthousands ofwomen underwent HDC-ABMT. Fur-
ther clinical research was difficult to conduct because many women would not
participate in a randomized trial of HDC-ABMT after they learned it had be-
come the standard of care. Morethan a decade later, it became clear that HDC-
ABMT had no demonstrable medical value for women with metastatic breast
cancer. The aggregate price tag for HDC-ABMT exceeded $3 billion, and the
social loss, including pain, loss of life, and dashed hopes was fhr greater. Inap-
propriate attitudes and incentives were major contributors to such debacles:
[P]hysicians and other purveyors of specific health services become pas-
sionate advocates for the services they provide, instead of objective care-
givers, whoserecommendations are governed strictlyby scientific evidence
of efficacy.... Enthusiasts believe they are doing good for patients, often
despite considerable evidence and a consensus to the contrary. This mis-
placed zeal also partially explains why overuse is so resistant to informa-
tion-based approaches to solution."
101. See David A. Grimes, Technology Follies: The Uncritical Acceptance of Medical
Innovation, 269 JAMA 3030 (1993).
102. See GEN. ACCOuNTNG OFFICE, HEALTH INsuRANCE: COVERAGE OF AUTOLoGous
BONE MARROW TRANSPLANTATION FOR BREAST CANCER (GAO/HEHS-96-83); Michelle M.
Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, The Controversy over High-Dose Chemotherapy withAutologous
BoneMarrow TransplantforBreast Cancer, 21 HEALTHAFFS. (forthcoming 2001); Gina Kolata
& Kurt Eihenwald, Business Thrives on Unproven Care, LeavingScience Behind, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 3,1999, atAl.
103. Chassin, supra note 13, at 571.
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Such "misplaced zeal" can persist for a very long time, particularly when
providers suffer no adverse financial consequences - and may even profit -
by delivering inefficacious treatments. However, few things are likely to
bring "true believers" to their senses as quickly as the combination of clinical
failures and unpaid fees. When compensation is tied to results, "passionate
advocacy" for a treatment must confront the financial consequences of being
wrong. When providers can only "do well by doing good," they will "do good"
much more often and much more consistently than is currently the case.
Stated less tendentiously, it is reasonable to expect that RBCAs will encour-
age providers to evaluate unproven treatments cautiously and objectively.1°4
Better attitudes and social norms will protect patients from unproven treat-
ments and save everyone money in the bargain.
Few health care providers knowingly harm patients or intentionally
provide substandard services. Doctors who performed HDC-ABMT wanted
to help women stricken with breast cancer, not to hurt them. They battled
long and hard with insurance companies to obtain coverage for the procedure
because they thought it offered terminally ill patients a chance. However,
wanting to help is not enough. Wanting to help may even endanger patients
by causing them to receive medical treatments that are inefficacious or exces-
sively risky. In a system that is functioning optimally, providers will want to
know whether and how well procedures work, to assess success rates dispas-
sionately, and to consider the costs patients incur as well as the benefits they
receive. By encouraging providers to develop more patient-oriented mindsets
and discouraging them from turning into "true believers," RBCAs can encour-
age the development of a true culture of quality in the health care sector.
C. The Political and Policy Logic of RBCAs
RBCAs are contractual provisions. In recommending them, we deviate
substantially from conventional proposals for improving quality and reducing
error rates. Most researchers advocate'top-down" regulatory strategies, such
as mandatory practice guidelines, mandatory reporting, consolidations of low-
volume providers, and the like."°5 Although coercive regulatory strategies
clearly have a role to play, they possess only limited value for handling many
of the problems outlined in Part I1. Efforts to regulate invariably trigger pro-
vider opposition, lobbying, and a full range of inefficiencies and unanticipated
104. See, e.g., Leape, supra note 32, at377 ("Much has been made of economic motivation
in recent years, but it is unlikely that many surgeons recommend useless operations solely
because of greed. It seems probable, however, that in questionable cases, they are more likely
to recommend a service they provide. As we have seen, there is evidence that doctors in [FFS]
practice recommend more operations than doctors in prepaid plans.").
105. See Chassin, supra note 13, at 585 (enumerating these policy strategies).
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consequences."c Moreover, and as public-choice theorists would predict,
regulators frequently give the interests of health care professionals too much
weight when developing rules.
RBCAs follow a different path, premised on the reality that providers
have a number of comparative advantages over regulators in actually improv-
ing quality. Because they participate in the "retail" rendering of services
every day, health care providers have access to the information and skills that
are needed to ensure the consistent delivery of high quality care. The trick is
to create incentives for providers to gather this information and to develop
systems for assuring quality. Regulators have great difficulty in accomplish-
ing this goal because they must gather information and monitor quality using
top-down mechanisms. Worse, their preferred strategy (imposing sanctions
against the worst offenders) does little or nothing to motivate non-sanctioned
health care providers and actually can trigger a profession-wide backlash."°7
In contrast, RBCAs work from the bottom-up, by creating micro-level
incentives for decision makers to collect, interpret, and act on information.
Where regulators have to fight determined opponents every step of the way,
RBCAs work automatically. They convert people who prefer secrecy into
supporters of openness. In the medical sector, RBCAs should steadily im-
prove, as new signals of patient health are devised and outcomes become more
transparent. Doctors would suddenly have an interest in improving the accu-
racy and reliability ofthese signals. Better signals would mean more accurate
tracking, and more accurate tracking would lead to more business and higher
referral fees.
RBCAs also have one other feature that makes them particularly attrac-
tive from a policy perspective. They preserve providers' professional auton-
omy. The great indictment of managed care has been that it puts bureaucrats
in charge of medical decisions. Payors spend hundreds of millions of dollars
a year reviewing providers' recommendations because they know that over-
treatment is a serious problem in American medicine."c By placing providers
106. See generally Troycn A. Brennan, The Role of Regulation in Quality Improvement,
76 MILBANKQ. 709, 713 (1998); Burton, supra note 52, atAl (noting opposition ofKentucky
Department of Insurance, at behest of Kentucky Hospital Association, to Anthem's CABO
report cards).
107. This is precisely what has happened in connection with the government's crackdown
on fraud in Medicare and Medicaid. See David A. Hyman, Health Care Fraud and Abuse:
Market Change, Social Norms, and 'the Trust Reposed in the Workmen,' 30 3. LEGAL STUD.
(forthcoming 2001).
108. Bob Janieson, MO to Docs: You Decide, available athttp'/www.abenews.go.com/
sections/us/DailyNewsunited991108Jhtml (last visited Sept. 17, 2001) (reporting that United
Healthcare, nation's second-largest health insurer, spent $100 million reviewing doctors
assessments of medical necessity). United Health Care ultimately discontinued many of these
oversight mechanisms because they concluded they were not cost-effective, and alienated both
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who deliver poor outcomes at risk of losing money, RBCAs would reduce the
need for MCOs to become involved in day-to-day decision-making. Why
second-guess doctors or other providers who are backing their judgments and
recommendations with their own dollars? RBCAs also would enable superior
providers to attract larger numbers of patients by offering warranties."0 '
By and large, health care providers are good people."' Yet, good charac-
ter and honorable intentions have failed to improve the quality of health care
and to bring down medical error rates. We will not solve these problems until
providers, patients, and payors "have a shared economic future, leading them
to see that it is in thcir mutual, continuing best interest to overcome the diffi-
cult hurdles along the path of improvement toward the achievement of nearly
error-free performance." ' RBCAs can create the community of interest that
is required.
D. Some Criticisms of RBCAs
Opposition to RBCAs has arisen from several sources. This Part ad-
dresses criticisms of the following three types: ethical, technical, and philo-
sophical.
1. Ethical Objections to RBCAs
Many providers oppose RBCAs on ethical grounds. The American Medi-
cal Association's Code of Medical Ethics (Code) prohibits doctors from con-
ditioning the right to payment on the success of a treatment or procedure. 2
The prohibition is a recent addition to the Code. Until 1994, Opinion 6.01
stated only that "a physician's fee for medical services should be based on the
value of the service provided bythephysicianto the patient.""' Inthatyear, a
patients and providers. See a (noting that cohipany "paid more money to scrutinize and deny
questionable treatments than the practice saved").
109. See HealthWeek No. 202 (P.B.S. television broadcast, May 7, 1998) (reporting that
one vein removal clinic estimated that its guarantee "brought in ten to fifteen percent more
patientst ).
110. To be sure, there are exceptions, if the number of providers who have been convicted
of health care fraud is any guide. See David A. Hyman, HIPAA and Health Care Fraud:
Where's The Beef?, 21 CATO . (forthcoming 2002) (presenting data indicating that some hun-
dred health care providers are criminally prosecuted every year and several thousand are ex-
cluded from federal health care programs for variety of forms of misconduct).
111. Charles R. Buck, Health Care Through a Six Sigma Lens, 76 MIr ANK Q. 749,751
(1998).
112. See AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICs, Op. 6.01 (1994) (prohibiting RBCAs); David
A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Just What the Patient Ordered: The Case ForResult-Based Com-
pensation in Health Care, 29 . LAW MED. &ETICS 170-73 (2001) (offering extended critique
of AMA's position).
113. Hyman&Silver, supra note 112, at 170.
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new paragraph was added to Opinion 6.01 statingthat "a physician's fee should
not be made contingent on the successful outcome of medical treatment.
11 4
The stated ground forthis attack on RCBAs was that these arrangements "imply
that successful outcomes fromtreatment are guaranteed, thus creating unrealis-
tic expectations of medicine and false promises to consumers." '' 5
Although the Code frames the issue as an ethical principle, the amendment
to Opinion 6.01 actually couples an empirical claim - that RBCAs imply
guarantees of success - with a policy claim - that the best way of combating
unrealistic expectations and false promises is bybanning RBCAs. Both claims
are demonstrably false. They also betray the AMA's fundamental misunder-
standing of the nature, prevalence, and promise of result-based compensation.
Principals and agents use RBCAs when both understand that success is
not guaranteed but depends instead on the quality and quantity of an agent's
work. When success is certain or varies little with effort, principals do not use
result-based arrangements because there is nothing, other than the delivery of
the service itself, upon which to condition payment. The point of paying on
the basis of results is to motivate optimal performance when the possibility of
failure is real.
In contrast to the AMA's assertion, RBCAs actually make the risk of
failure explicit. They tie an agent's right to payment to a chosen indicator of
success, and they provide for the allocation of costs when the standard is not
met. For the same reasons, RBCAs neither constitute false promises nor
foster unreasonable expectations.
It is true that RBCAs lend credence to providers' judgments and recom-
mendations. Both are more credible when they come from a provider who
shares in the risk of failure than when a provider stands to make money win or
lose. This, however, is all to the good. Unless one assumes that doctors are
infallible - and there is good evidence that they are not - one must admit that
patients need some basis for evaluating doctors' recommendations and ser-
vices. Patients are, after all, the final arbiters of their own treatments. How-
ever, because patients are unsophisticated, it is hard for them to make inde-





116. See Sanford . Grossman, The InformationalRole of Warranties andPrivate Disclo-
sureProduct Quality, 24 J.L. & ECON. 461,471 (1981) ("A doctor may know that he is the best
doctor in existence, but there is no way (at a reasonable cost) that he can prove this to a pro-
spective patient In situations in which a seller's information cannot be conveyed to a buyer,
the seller's warranty can, in effect, transmit that information to the buyer. There is a sense in
which the degree ofwarranty can be a sufficient statistic for the seller's information.").
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If anything is likely to foster "unrealistic expectations and false prom-
ises," it is FFS medicine and other payment options that are not result-based.
These methods fail to reflect the reality that a patient's chances of returning
to good health depend greatly on a provider's care and skill. Moreover, these
methods are also inconsistent with the long-standing imperative of Opinion
6.01, that "a physician's fee for medical services should be based on the value
of the service provided by the physician to the patient.""' How is '"the value
of the service... to the patient" to be measured, if not in terms of the patient's
health and welfare? Yet, only RBCAs explicitly connect providers' fees to
what patients value.
Even if Opinion 6.01 were correct in that RBCAs did have the potential
to mislead patients, it would still be wrong as a policy matter to prohibit them.
A disclosure requirement would suffice and would have the added advantage
of ensuring that patients receive better information about treatment risks. Pro-
viders are already expected to tell patients about these risks when obtaining
consent for medical procedures. Mandated disclosure of the variability of
outcomes associated with procedures paid for by RBCAs would fit comfort-
ably within this model. In fact, lawyers who enter into contingent fee arrange-
ments routinely disclose in their engagement letters that success is not and
cannot be guaranteed. It is difficult to see how patients can have "unrealistic
expectations" when disclosure statements tell them that medical procedures
are risky.
The AMA often has used claims of professionalism to oppose measures
that would make the medical marketplace more competitive."' In 1977, the
Federal Trade Commission obtained an injunction prohibiting the AMA from
enforcing its ethical rules because they were being employed in an anti-com-
petitive fashion.' 9 It is important to remember the AMA's tendency to protect
doctors' financial interests when evaluating the merits ofthe 1994 amendment
to Opinion 6.01. The amendment passed when RBCAs were first making in-
roads into the health care sector. The probability that the true aim of those
who supported the amendment was to stifle economic innovation should not
be dismissed.
Finally, because RBCAs are quality-enhancing measures, it is hard to see
how any sort of ethical objection could be raised against them. The point of
117. AMACoDE OF MEDICALETHICS, Op. 6.01 (1994).
118. See PAUL FmnsTEwN, THE Poirrics OF HEALTH LEGISLATION: AN ECONOMIC PER-
sPECTivE 77 (Health Admin. Press, 2d ed. 1996) ("Medical associations have frequently used
alarmed references to 'ethical behavior' whenever a proposed action might result in price
competition.").
119. See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979),mod#7ed and
enforced, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd by an evenly divided court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982).
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paying providers for results is to motivate them to perform better. This is why
principals use contingent fees when dealing with agents they cannot readily
monitor. The desire to signal superior performance also explains why many
professional agents, including doctors, commit themselves to ethical codes.12°
Because it is clear that doctors have specialized knowledge, are difficult to
monitor, and often make mistakes, a quality-based case against RBCAs is
difficult to make.
The ethical propriety of RBCAs becomes even clearer when one consid-
ers that providers currently employ highly imperfect signals of patient health.
It must be evident to all that society does not pay providers on an FFS basis
because it wants them to keep busy. Providers are paid for performing mam-
mograms, x-rays, surgeries, and other procedures because the frequency with
which they provide discrete services is thought to correlate with patient health.
The more maograms, x-rays, and surgeries they deliver, the healthier the
population is supposed to be. In reality, frequency of service is a poor signal
of quality. The evidence shows quite clearly that providers often deliver
services that make patients worse off. Many medical procedures expose
patients to health-related risks they need not incur.
The reason for having a code of ethics is to improve the quality of service
that a profession supplies. If result-based indicators track quality more pre-
cisely than other signals and thereby motivate doctors to treat patients better,
it would seem to be unethical not to use them. Consequently, there can be no
ethical reason to perpetuate compensation arrangements that pay top-dollar
for services that are second-rate.
2. Technical Objections to RBCAs
Opponents of RBCAs have raised the following five kinds of technical
objections to their use: informational inadequacies; mismatches between
compensation and quality; "cherry-picking"; improper substitution of medical
procedures for non-medical procedures; and wrongful neglect of aspects of
care where quality is not measured.
a. Informational Preconditions
For RBCAs to function well, it must be possible to distinguish good
performance from bad performance. In 1971, A.J. Culyer ridiculed the notion
of insurance tying a provider's payment to a patient's benefit because he
believed the "costs of discovering whether [a] treatment had been 'success-
120. SeeMARK ATLLMAKINGMPDICALSPENDINGDECISIONS 183 (OxfordU. Pre 1997)
(observing that agents routinely employ such "bonding" strategies to signal reliability).
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fuI'" were "enormous.' 21  In the intervening three decades, the science of
quality measurement has made great strides." Quality measures now exist
for the treatment of major depressive disorder, low back pain, breast cancer,
high-risk behaviors (smoking, obesity, and alcohol use), and diabetes. "[I]n
many instances, [these] measures have the same degree of accuracy as the
majority of measures used in clinical medicine to make vital decisions about
patient care."'" In addition, treatment guidelines and critical pathways have
been developed for hundreds of conditions. Although report cards are not
available for most surgical procedures, it is possible to gauge the performance
of individual providers and groups.
Outcomes that are difficult to measure directly often can be evaluated
indirectly with reasonable precision and at acceptable cost. For example,
although it may be impossible to show that a treatment increased a specific
patient's life expectancy, changes in blood pressure, blood chemistry, body
weight, heart rhythms, and other variables that correlate with longevity can be
determined easily. Drug companies and academic researchers already use
such indirect measures, called "surrogate endpoints," to test the efficacy of
pharmaceuticals and medical procedures.1
24
121. AJ. Culyer, The Nature of the Commodity 'Health Care' andfts EffcientAllocation,
23 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 189,197 (1971).
122. See generally Thomas Bodenheimer, TheAmerican Health Care System- The Move-
mentfor Improved Quality in Health Care, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 488 (1999).
123. Mark R. Chassin & Robert W. Palvin, The Urgent Need to Improve Health Care
Quality, 280 JAMA 1000, 1001 (1998); see AHCPR PUBUCATION NO. 96-N020, BREAST
CANCER, available at http'/www.ahopr.gov/qual brcancer.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2001);
AHCPR PUBLICATION No. 96-N021, ASSESSMENT OF HEALTH RISK BEHAviORS AMONG
ADULTS, available at httpJ/www.ahcpr.gov/qual/hriskhlm (last visited Sept 26, 2001);
AHCPR PUBLICATION No. 96-N022, DIABETEs, available at http:/www.ahcpr.gov/qual/
diabetes.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2001); AHCPR PUBLICATION No. 96-N023, DEPREsSION,
available at http'/www.ahcpr.gov/quaIdepress.htm; AHCPR PUBLICATION No. 96-N024,
MEAZURNHEALTHCAREQUALTY: LOWBACKPAINANDASSOCIATEDTREATMENTOPITONS,
available at http'/www.ahcpr.gov/qua1/depress.htm (last visited Sept 26, 2001); EXPANSION
OF QUAYMEAsuREs (Q-SPAN), AwNcY FOR HEALTH CARE POLICY AND RESEARCH (Jan.
12, 1998), available at http'//www.ahrq.gov/qual/qspanovr.htm (decribing efforts to develop
quality measures for dental care plans, asthma treatment, managed care, cardiovascular diseases,
functionality in hip fracture victims, and other health care areas); QUAUTY INDICATORS PROM
Trm HETHCARE COST AND UTZATION PRomcr (HICUP QLS),AENCYFORHEALTHCARE
RESEARCH AND QUAL TY (Mar. 1999), available athttp'J/www.ahrq.gov/data/ hcup/qifacthtm
(describing efforts to make quality measures developed by government agencies available to
private purchasers); David Blumenthal, Health Care Reform at the Close of the 20th Centuy,
340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1916 (1999).
124. See New Drug, Antibiotic and Biological Drug Product Regulations: Accelerated Ap-
proval, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,234, 13,235 (Apr. 15,1992) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 314, 601)
("A surrogate endpoint, or 'marker,' is a laboratory measurement or physical sign that is used
in therapeutic trials as a substitute for a clinically meaningful endpoint that is a direct measure
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A surrogate endpoint is a risk factor that can be measured precisely and
that is thought to reliably signal changes in health. For example, high blood
pressure, obesity, high blood cholesterol, and lipid levels are risk factors that
pharmaceutical companies use as surrogate endpoints when testing medica-
tions intended to fight cardiovascular disease. Drug companies rarely assess
changes in actual morbidity and mortality rates because full-blown clinical
trials using these measures would be unduly costly and would delay the intro-
duction ofnew medicines for years. Instead, companies do short-term studies
on small populations and measure changes in risk factors. If a drug reduces
lipid levels in the sample population, an inference is drawn that it is an effec-
tive tool for promoting good health by decreasing the risk of cardiovascular
disease. Millions of Americans take medicines whose efficacy was demon-
strated through the use of surrogate endpoints.
Doctors also rely on surrogate endpoints. They prescribe medications
under circumstances that have not been clinically tested. They also follow
treatment protocols and perform medical procedures that reduce risk factors
without requiring a demonstration that any given patient's longevity is demon-
strably improved. This is why doctors give vaccinations and provide other
preventive services, treat patients for obesity, and tell patients to stop smok-
ing. In reality, doctors already use outcome-based signals. Their compensa-
tion is loosely tied to these signals when they charge for such services on an
FFS basis.
Given the availability of direct and indirect measures of quality and out-
come, it is worth considering why providers have not introduced RBCAs on
their own." 5 A number of explanations are plausible, including professional
norms, path dependence, the newness of quality measures, and the cost of col-
lecting and processing information. Many providers have primitive systems
for analyzing data, and these inadequacies "place an inherent limit on the
quality of today's performance measures. o1
6
of how a patient feels, functions, or survives and is expected to predict the effect of the ther-
apy."). Pharmaceutical companies frequently use such surrogate endpoints to demonstrate the
potential oftheir products to improve patients' health. See Bruce M. Psaty et al., Surrogate End
Points Health Outcomes, and the Drug-Approval Proce for the Treatment of Risk Factors
for Cardiovascular Disease, 282 JAMA 786 (1999); Robert Temple, Are Surrogate Markers
Adequate toAssess CardiovascularDisease Drugs?, 282 JAMA 790 (1999).
125. When an early version of this paper was presented, a skeptical commentator asked,
"if RBCAs make so much sense, why aren't they being used already?" Although this observa-
tion forms the premise of a famous joke about economists ("if that was really a $20 bill lying
in the gutter, the market would have picked it up already"), the reality is that some providers are
experimenting with RBCAs, and the prevalence of non-result based compensation arrangements
is not an inevitable state of nature.
126. David K. Eddy, Performance MeasuremenL Problems and Solutions, 17 HEALTH
AFFs. 8, 14 (1998).
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Yet, these obstacles have been overcome by some providers and payors.
Fertility clinics that offer in-vitro fertilization (lF) closely monitor their
success rates because they must. lVF services are expensive, invasive, emo-
tionally demanding, and rarely covered by insurance. To attract patients, VF
clinics have to demonstrate their ability to deliver pregnancies. Payors and
accrediting agencies have also succeeded in gathering performance-related in-
formation by demanding that providers supply it:
Five years ago, whenNCQA [the National Council on Quality Assurance]
released its firstHealthPlan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS),
we knew nothing about the quality of health plans except what could be
gleaned from voluntary systems review (through NCQA accreditation).
Today consumers, health care purchasers, regulators, researchers, and
healthplan managers have unprecedented ability to evaluate and improve
the care and services delivered to millions of Americans enrolled in man-
aged care organizations.
27
Health care providers are not accustomed to collecting and analyzing
performance data. Historically, their 'job descriptions" have not required that
they do this." Yet, providers are willing to change when compensation is
tied to measurable performance targets. Experience suggests that the profit-
ability of measuring affects the tendency to measure. Health care providers
can and will measure outcomes when they gain by doing so.'
b. Compensation/Quality Mismatches
Another common objection to RBCAs is that they are impracticable
because high quality care can lead to bad outcomes and low quality care can
lead to good outcomes. Although this problem can certainly occur, the desire
to prohibit RBCAs for this reason is a classic example ofthe "nirvana fallacy"
at work.13 0 A payment measure need not be perfect for it to beat the competi-
tion because all methods of paying agents are imperfect. The right question
is whether, across all cases, an imperfect RBCA creates better incentives than
127. Cary SennettMovingAhead, Measure byMeasure, 17 H&ALTHAFFS. 36,36 (1998).
128. See Berwick, supra note 35, at 437.
129. In this regard, we differ substantially with Professor Jacobi. See John V. Jacobi,
Patients at a Loss: Protecting Health Care Consumers Through Data Driven QualityAssur-
ance, 45 KAN. L. REV. 705, 781 (1997) ("There is no question that valid, broad- based outcomes
data are the most important indicators of quality. For reasons described above, however, this
"holy grail" is unlikely to be available in the near fiture.").
130. See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. &
EcON. 1, 1 (1969) ("The view that now pervades much public policy economics implicitly
presents the relevant choice as between an ideal norm and an existing 'imperfect' institutional
arrangement This nirvana approach differs considerably from a comparative institution approach
in which the relevant choice is between alternative real institutional arrangements.").
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an imperfect non-performance based system of compensation. Considerable
evidence from other sectors of the economy suggests that RBCAs have much
to offer everyone involved in the health care market.
Similar difficulties apply to the suggestion that an RBCA tied to a
process-based measure of quality is simply a form of FFS medicine, with all
the distortions implied by that approach.' Examples of process-based
measures might be immunization rates for patient groups, rates of delivering
other preventive or diagnostic services, or rates of following up on tests that
reveal abnormal results. If RBCAs tied to process-based measures of quality
induce providers to deliver more ofthese services, so much the better. Indeed,
process-based measures of quality have certain advantages over outcome-
based measures: they are "frequent, immediate, controllable, and rarely con-
founded by other factors - and if properly designed, can steer plans toward
particular activities that are known to be effective." '32
c. Cheny Picking
Another common complaint about RCBAs is that they would encourage
providers to "cherry pick" by treating patients with good success odds and
excluding patients who, being seriously ill, are poor risks. The net result
would be a reduction in global access to services. As cross-subsidies within
the entire patient pool were progressively eliminated, some patients would
become unable to find providers who were willing to help them at any price.'33
We agree that RBCAs would encourage providers to sort cases. This is
one of the principal benefits of RBCAs, namely, their tendency to encourage
agents to balance costs, risks, and benefits when assessing the desirability of
possible actions. If asked to accept an RCBA for performing a CABG, a
cardiac surgeon would rationally consider many factors, including the likeli-
hood that the patient would die. If the patient's survival odds were dismal, the
surgeon would reject the offer, sending a clear signal that the small likelihood
of success failed to justify the investment of medical resources."3
RBCAs thus frame in cold numerical terms the reality that some medical
interventions are inefficient and should not be performed. In a world laden
with RBCAs, doctors would get better and better at predicting outcomes. Con-
131. See William Sage, Physicians asAdvocates, 35 Hous. L. REv. 1529 (1999).
132. Eddy, supra note 126, at 17-18.
133. See HealthWeek No. 202, supra note 109 (stating that at Shady Grove fertility center
in Gaithersburg, Maryland, "patients who have a poor prognosis are not offered [the refund]
program").
134. See MLLSON, supra note 41, at 190-91 (describing computerized program that
gives probability of patient surviving surgery and leaving the hospital ("prob mort"), based on
various clinical indicators).
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sequently, they would more often send the message that the cost of health care
exceeds the likely gain. This would be a radical departure from current prac-
tice, where a procedure that has even a small upside potential qualifies as
"medically necessary" and is likely to be performed. Existing payment ar-
rangements spare doctors and patients from having to confront this problem
head on, butthe consequences ofthis approachhave been disastrous for society
at large.
Consider one telling incident from New York's implementation of car-
diac surgery report cards. One hospital objected to its low rating, arguing that
because a particular patient was "near-death" at the time of the surgery, the
hospital could not fairly be blamed for the morbid result. The regulators tartly
responded that the hospital "shouldn't be operating on dead people. 1 35 This
insight can be generalized. Across the entire market for health care, services
are routinely provided without adequate consideration of their benefits and
costs.
It may be useful to think about the likely sorting effect in the medical
sector by examining the legal services marketplace, where RBCAs have long
been used to regulate claimants' access to representation. Every day, lawyers
working on contingency receive thousands of requests for representation. For
obvious reasons, they reject most requests from would-be clients with weak
cases. Although rejection rates are high across the board, lawyers who handle
medical malpractice claims are especially selective because these cases are
both risky and especially expensive to prepare.1 36 Because potential plaintiffs
who cannot convince lawyers to take their cases are left to their own devices,
the market for legal services operates as a gatekeeper for access to the legal
system.137 By screening cases, plaintiffs' attorneys channel private and public
resources toward good claims and away from bad ones. If RBCAs do not lead
to unacceptable cherry picking in law, it is unclear why they would do so in
health care. Sauce for the goose, anyone?
That said, it would nonetheless be possible to prevent or limit the extent
of cherry picking in the health care sector if policy makers were unwilling to
135. Seeid.at211.
136. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingency Fee Lawyers as Gatekeepers in the American
Civil Justice System, 81 JUDICATUIME 22 (1997) ("Lawyers are extremely cautious in accepting
medical malpractice cases, and the lawyers I observed spent a lot of time explaining to these
potential clients why their negative medical outcome did not constitute malpractice, or the diffi-
culty in establishing that it did arise from malpractice, or that even if it was malpractice, the
ultimate medical outcome was probably not affected by the error (and the interim consequences
did not give rise to damages that made pursuing the matter financially attractive).").
137. See, e.g., Merritt v. Faulkner, 697 F.2d 761, 769 (7th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 464
U.S. 986 (1983) (noting that inability of prisoner to obtain private lawyer to represent him in
damages action indicated probable merits of case).
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sanction it. Risk-adjusted RBCAs, which pay providers more for treating
patients who are poorer risks, could offset any tendencyto select against high-
risk patients. By offering premiums to providers who handle sicker patients,
risk-adjusted RBCAs would render them indifferent to patients' ex ante health
status. Policy makers could even encourage providers toprefer sicker patients
by offering disproportionately large bonuses for treating them.
Alternatively, if one were convinced that all patients should have access
to all forms of medical care, no matter how expensive the procedure or how
high the likelihood of failure, one could continue to make procedures avail-
able on an FFS basis for patients who are especially sick. Our proposal, which
is to introduce RBCAs into the health care marketplace, does not require pay-
ors to abandon other forms of compensation. However, once RBCAs become
available, the differentials between a straight RBCA, a risk-adjusted RBCA,
and an FFS price will provide a highly salient signal of the true costs and risks
of treatment.
The solutions we have offered to the problem of cherry picking are, of
course, likely to create problems of their own. For example, risk-adjusted
RBCAs would give providers opportunities to profit by "cooking the books;"
that is, by reporting as "high risk" patients who actually were "low risk."
Making FFS payment an option for high risk patients might encourage the
worst providers to concentrate on patients who, arguably, need the best care.
Again, our point is not that RBCAs are trouble-free. It is that they have sig-
nificant untapped potential to encourage health care providers to do better,
and that they are better than other forms of payment when sensibly used.
More experience will make it possible to determine the magnitude of the prob-
lems RBCAs generate, but the early results show solid quality improvements
when RBCAs are employed.
d. Substitution ofMedical Services for Non-MedicalAlternatives
A different but related objection to RBCAs is that they may create un-
desirable incentives to substitute medical services for non-medical alterna-
tives. For example, an increasing number of IVF clinics offer RBCAs. Two
scholars have contended that to turn a profit on this basis, IVF clinics must
raise their success rates substantially."ra The easiest way to accomplish this
is for clinics to broaden their pool of patients to include couples whose odds
of conceiving children naturally are far better than those of couples who
currently purchase VF.139 If existing practices are used as the baseline, the
138. David C. Schmitflein &Donald G. Morrison, A Live Baby or Your Money Back: The
Marketing of In Vitro Fertilization Procedures 4 (Aug. 7, 1998) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with authors) (modeling economics of money-back guarantees).
139. Ih at 1.
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RBCA provides a powerful economic incentive for such couples to opt-into
IVF "too soon" instead of using it as the treatment of last resort - and an
equally powerful incentive for physicians to talk them into doing so.'
The difficulty with this argument is the implicit assumption that the
patient mix is uniquely "right" under FFS. This is unlikely. Even under FFS,
incentives to take advantage of IVF services, and therefore the patient mix,
have changed over time. As the price of the procedure dropped and its reli-
ability improved, IVF became attractive to more couples, including some
whose prospects of conceiving children naturally were better than those
previous users ofthe procedure. RBCAs may, and likely will, change the mix
again, if only by bringing in couples that could not afford multiple rounds of
this risky treatment. By itself, this fact has no ethical or normative force. One
could just as easily start with the patient mix under an RBCA and contend that
the different mix under FFS is unduly restrictive and wrongly limits the oppor-
tunities of marginally more fertile couples to receive IVF.
To make the "wrongfil substitution" objection work, one must establish
that there is something wrong with couples choosing IVF when their odds of
natural conception exceed some threshold. As long as the decision to seek
IVF is properly informed, we see no basis for this assessment.' The decision
to try IVF is a momentous one that couples usually make after much soul-
searching and consultation. Few couples with good prospects for natural
conception will lightly incur the substantial risks, costs, and personal burdens
associated with IVF.
The "wrongful substitution' argument is really just a paternalistic claim
masquerading as a technical objection.' 42 Any technological breakthrough
140. Ie at6,45.
141. Professors Schmittlein and Morrison appear to agree because they emphasize the
importance of disclosure and of patients being aware whether they are in the "last resort" pool
or the "less infertile/too early" pool. Id. at 41-44.
142. Cf. David Orentlicher, Destructuring Disability: Rationing of Health Care and
Unfair Discrimination Against The Sick, 31 HARV. C.R.-CL. L. REV. 49, 60 (1996) (noting
treatment of contestable value judgments as technical/professional issues).
Generally, obstetricians offer amniocentesis to check for Down syndrome in preg-
nant women without a family history of Down syndrome only if the women are at
least thirty-five years old. This general rule reflects, in part, the fact that when the
woman is age thirty-five or over, the risk that the fetus will suffer from Down syn-
drome is equal to or greater than the risk that the amniocentesis will inadvertently
abort the fetus. In other words, the medical community has concluded that women
should be offered amniocentesis only when the risk of detecting a Down syndrome
fetus equals or exceeds the risk of aborting a normal fetus. While this may be a
reasonable balance to draw, it is also the case that many women may have very
strong feelings about not having a Down syndrome child and may therefore wish
to undergo amniocentesis unless the risk of an abortion is five, ten, or even twenty
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that makes a medical procedure safer, more effective, or less expensive will
change the patient mix. The same can be said for any significant economic
change, such as an increase in the supply of doctors or hospitals that reduces
prices, or an increase in wealth that stimulates demand. There is no reason
why these changes should not influence patients' choices, as long as patients
are properly informed. The notion that patients should select among health
care options without regard to cost, safety, or effectiveness is absurd.
e. RBCAs and the Micro-Management of Quality
RBCAs also create the risk of a different kind of substitution. Providers
who know that their compensation is tied to a particular measure of quality
may focus on this measure to the exclusion of other important considera-
tions. In other words, if compensation is tied to improvements in measured
areas but deterioration in unmeasured areas is not considered, havoc can
result.143 Worse, if RBCAs attempt to counter this incentive by being exhaus-
tive, they end up micro-managing the delivery of health care through bureau-
cratic rule-making, instead of taking advantage of the specialized knowledge
of providers.!"
An example may help the reader appreciate this concern. Suppose we
compensate doctors based on the time they spend with patients but ignore the
time nurses spend with patients and the time patients spend in waiting rooms.
Doctors will then have an incentive to see patients personally instead of send-
ing them to nurses who can treat them less expensively but just as well.
Doctors also will have an interest in spending more time than necessary with
individual patients even if this means that other patients must wait.
This complaint is well-founded, but generic. Any guarantee or warranty
that covers fewer than all properties of a good or service entails the identified
risk. Yet, outside the health care sector, one encounters partial RBCAs at
every turn. Real estate agents tie their compensation to the prices at which
properties change hands, but they do not receive extra compensation for
returning phone calls promptly nor do they guarantee that clients will like
their personalities. Tire manufacturers warrant their products against tread
wear and punctures, but they do not promise that tires will continue to look
times the risk of giving birth to a Down syndrome fetus. Reasonable people can
differ on the appropriate place to draw the balance, and medical expertise does not
help us settle the question.
Id
143. See Lawrence P. Casalino, The Unintended Consequences ofMeasuring Quality on
the Quality ofMedical Care, 341 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1147 (1999).
144. See Eddy, supra note 126, at 17.
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attractive or that drivers will enjoy a particular experience when cornering.
RBCAs routinely omit many features of goods and services that may matter
to principals.
For this criticism ofhealth care RBCAs to be compelling, one must show
that RBCAs create more problems than they solve. Continuing the example
used above, one wants to know, for example, whether patients will wait a
minute longer to see a physician or an hour longer, and whether nurses will
see one percent fewer patients than they should or fifty percent fewer. These
matters are not appropriate for armchair speculation. Solid evidence shows
that existing health care delivery arrangements disserve many patients. Exper-
iments with RBCAs also have yielded real improvements for patients. By
itself, the generic complaint about the possible deterioration of unmeasured
aspects of care does not warrant a prohibition on RBCAs. It merely warrants
an attitude of caution and realism on the part of those designing and imple-
menting health care RBCAs.
3. Philosophical Objections
Some providers oppose RBCAs on the ground that health care is too
important to be left to the unthinking and unfeeling forces of supply and
demand. Others suggest that, as a society, we should respect the professional-
ism of providers and simply trust theirjudgments. These philosophical beliefs
help explain why the managed care revolution upset so many doctors and
patients. 45 The change from FFS payment to capitation, preferred provider
discounts, bonuses for cost reduction, and medical spending accounts was not
just a matter of different mechanisms for purchasing widgets; patients' health
and lives were at stake.
Yet, merely the fact that RBCAs employ rather than ignore market forces
provides no a priori reason for opposing them. The evidence is clear that
economic incentives do influence health care providers. RBCAs take advan-
tage of this fact by enlisting providers' self-interest in the cause of helping
patients. If the consequence is better health care, then that result should be
celebrated and RBCAs should be employed more broadly Ifthe consequence
is something else, then RBCAs should be opposed but on demonstrated empir-
ical grounds.
The real cause of philosophical unease with RBCAs is their tendency to
place front-and-center an issue that is difficult to face: whether it is reason-
145. One of the more pointed ironies of the managed care backlash is that it has caused
doctors and lawyers, who otherwise rarely see eye-to-eye, to become temporary allies and to
lobby for laws that would enable patients to sue managed care organizations (MCOs) for
medical malpractice.
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able to use scare resources to treat patients whose chances of benefitting are
poor. It is one thing to use computer programs like "prob mort" and
APACHE, which evaluate patients' survival odds, to compare the success
rates of CABG providers and ICUs, but many people believe that it is another
thing entirely to use survival odds as a basis for allocating access to care.
RBCAs generate a visceral reaction because people do not want to confront
the reality that tens of billions of dollars are spent every year on medical
services for people who will not live longer or get better, regardless of how
well providers care for them. Once one starts measuring outcomes and
focusing on results, it is hard not to question the rationality of existing prac-
tices, and it is hard to avoid thinking that resources should be transferred to
services that deliver better returns.
E. Health Care's Economic Dimension
Sometimes, access to health care is a matter of life and death. However,
ignoring the economic aspects of health care is hardly an effective response. 46
As a society, we can face reality and deal with the issue, or we can continue
to pretend that it does not exist. For years, we have buried our heads in the
sand. As a result, a record number of Americans are uninsured, the cost of
health care is extraordinary, and quality varies tremendously and is often in-
tolerably poor. Perhaps it is time to play the cards we have been dealt.
V RBCAs in Action
To date, result-based compensation is relatively uncommon in health
care. The most well-known example is the use of incentive-based perfor-
mance targets in contracts between employers and HMOs.'47 In 1995, the
Pacific Business Group on Health (PBGH), a consortium of employers who
collectively spend more than $3 billion annually on health care for nearly
146. See Jerome Kassirer, Managed Care and the Morality of the Marketplace, 333 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 50 (1995) (offering paradigmatic example of"econo-phobic" approach).
147. See BUYER'S HEALTH CARE ACTION GROUP, OUR PlILOSOPHY, available at http:I/
www.bheag.com/philosophy.asp (last visited Sept 21, 2001) (enumerating goals of Buyer's
Health Care Action Group, including "restructuring financial incentives ... to reward excellent
trealment given to the sickest patients"); MEYET AL, supra note 76 (describing few employ-
ers that use financial incentives and other techniques to improve health care for employees as
"pioneers," and noting that incentives include favorable pricing for health plans that participate
in quality studies and improvement initiatives, and fee releases tied to provision of standardized
information that helps employers compare quality of service across plans and providers); Helen
Halpin Schaufler et al., Raising the Bar: The Use ofPerformance Guarantees by the Pacific
Business Group on Health, 18 HEALTHAFFS. 134 (1999) (outlining use of performance con-
tracts by Pacific Business Group on Health).
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three million employees, decided to negotiate performance contracts with
HMOs. 48 Unfortunately, none of the HMOs could report baseline rates for
the frequency of the following three performance measures: prenatal care,
cholesterol screenings, and diabetic retinal exams. 49 Only a few could report
such baseline data on childhood immunization rates, another performance
measure."5 By 1996, PBGH's pressure caused the HMOs to gather the data
needed to establish baseline rates and to negotiate performance targets for
patient satisfaction and a variety of clinical procedures, such as prenatal care,
mmmographies, Pap smears, childhood immunizations, diabetic retinal exams,
cholesterol screenings, and cesarean sections.' Under the new contracts,
HMOs that failed to meet the targets forfeited a small portion oftheir fees.5 2
Of the $420 million in HMO premiums paid to the thirteen participants,
PBGH tied less than $8.5 million, about 2% of the total, to performance. 53
Despite the small amount of money at stake, over half of the HMOs met their
targets for patient satisfaction with health plan, and three of those that did not
still showed improvement as compared to 1995."5 Eight HMOs met their
goals for satisfaction with physicians, and five more barely missed.'
5
Real improvements also occurred in specific treatment areas. Five plans
met their goals for increasing childhood immunizations.' 56 Nine reduced their
rates of cesarean sections sufficiently, and the remaining four HMOs missed
their targets by only 0.7%. 57 Seven HMOs met their goals for mammogra-
phies and Pap smears.' Eight met their goals for prenatal care.'59 Again, in
each area, HMOs that fell short of their targets often beat their 1995 marks.
The possibility of having to rebate a mere 2% of collected premiums was
enough to improve the quality of health care."
PBGH's success has led other provider groups to copy its strategy. The
Massachusetts Health Care Purchasers Group now requires insurers who fail
to deliver "quality breakthroughs" to rebate a specified portion of premi-
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ums.1 The Central Florida Health Care coalition proposed a similar plan,
which pays providers more if they deliver better outcomes. 62 Other employer
groups are deploying similar strategies."
A recent proposal to address medical errors through selective contracting
also relies indirectly on RBCAs. The Leapfrog Group, a consortium of em-
ployers, pledged that its members will purchase health care services only from
providers who make certain specified investments in error reduction."6 Pro-
viders must adopt computerized systems for prescribing medicines, refer pa-
tients in need of complex procedures to hospitals with high survival rates, and
staff intensive care units with critical care physicians. 6 Governmental pro-
grams such as Medicaid andthe Children's Health Insurance Program are start-
ingto include performance incentives intheir contracts.'6 Several pharmaceu-
tical companies have offered money-back guarantees on particular products.16
Some health care providers have begun offering RBCAs as well. A small
number of physicians and clinics offer money-back guarantees for vasectomy
reversals, in-vitro fertilization, vein stripping, cavity prevention, and laser
vision correction."e These examples occur in circumstances in which insur-
161. Personal communication with Professor Frances Miller, Boston University Law
School.
162. Linda 0. Prager, Coalition Proposes Pay Based on Quality, AM. MED. NEWS, June
19, 2000, at 81 (reporting that under plan, physicians would be categorized as platinum, gold,
or silver based on outcome documented for ton conditions and could be reimbursed from 70%
to 120% of current Medicare rate for treating more employees with chronic illnesses).
163. See generally Thomas Bodenheimer & Kip Sullivan, How Large Employers Are
Shap ing the Health Care Marketplace (Pts. 1 & 2), 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1003,1084 (1998).
164. See Press Release, The Leapfrog Group, The Business Roundtable Launches Effort
to Help Reduce Medical Errors Through Purchasing Power Clout (Nov. 15, 2000), available
at http'/iwww.leapfroggroup.orgfabouthtmn (announcing purpose of program called "The Leap-
frog Group").
165. See THELEAPFRocGRoUPPAT1ENTSAFETY, available athttp'/Avww.leapfroggroup.
org/safetyl.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2001) (describing methods to improve patient safety).
166. Kevin B. Piper & Jeremy J. Alberga, Performance Incentives for Medicaid Health
Plans, SCHIP Programs, Health Care Policy Report (BNA) No. 8, at 1868 (Nov. 20,2000).
167. See, e.g., Pauline Anderson, Clozapine Comes with Money-Back Offer, MED. POST
2,43 (May 16,1995), available at http://www.mentalhealth.com/magl/p5l-cloz.hlml (report-
ing that Sandoz Canada Inc. promised reimbursements if doctors had to remove "patients with
treatment-resistant schizophrenia" from clozapine within six months, and that Merck-Frost has
offered reimbursements if patients put on finasteride (Proscar) require surgery for benign
prostatic hyperplasia afler one year of medical therapy); WTNH-TV News OnlineConsumer
Team, IHigher Strength Rogaine Available (Sept. 18, 1998), available at http:/www.wtnh.com/
newa/health/health091898.html (reporting that Upjohn "is so confident [that an extra strength
version of Rogaine will work], it's offering a full money back guarantee on the product").
168. See e.g.,A. TraffordMedicine 'sMoney Back Warranty, WAsIL PosT HEALTH, Aug.
5, 1997 (reporting that sixty or more in-vitro fertilization clinics offer refunds to patients);
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ance is typically not available, and patients must pay for procedures them-
selves. All involve elective procedures. All have an endpoint that can be
determined within a reasonable amount of time and at reasonable expense.
The probability of the endpoint being attained is affected, at least in part, by
the skill ofthe provider. The endpoint is not subject to manipulation by either
the provider or the patient. An individual provider or a small group of provid-
ers whose economic interests coincide provide the identified services, simpli-
fying the allocation of responsibility.
Finally, as noted previously, the Institute of Medicine recently recom-
mended the use of RBCAs, which it described as "an opportunity for provid-
ers to share in the benefits of quality improvement," to address quality defi-
ciencies and medical error rates. 6 9 These examples validate the analytical
model of RBCAs contained in Part IV, and demonstrate that nothing inherent
in health care precludes the adoption of RBCAs.
With the hope of encouraging more providers to offer RBCAs, we offer
some preliminary thoughts on areas where they might be usefully employed:
A. Bonuses for Good Results with CABG
Having discussed CABG at length, it seems appropriate to start with an
RBCA tailored to this context. In designing the payment structure, we must
first make clear what we want providers of CABG to accomplish. For simplic-
ity, we will assume that only the following objectives are important: perform-
ing the surgery correctly, discharging the patient alive, discharging the patient
in fewer than ten days, keeping the patient free of iatrogenic injuries and
nosocomial infections, and returning the patient to a defined functional status.
We also must decide how extensively we wish to micro-manage the
arrangements that bear on these goals. For example, we could separately hire
Claudia Morian, Money-Back Guarantees: Some Doctors Offer Them, But Are They Good
Medicine?, KANSAs CITY STAR, Mar. 15, 1999, at DI (discussing refunds offered by fertility
clinics and doctors who perform vasectomy reversals). Doctors in other fields also have begun
to explore this terrain. See Health WeekProgram No. 202, supra note 109 ("At the Vein Clin-
ics of America, a nationwide chain, doctors pledge to get rid of varicose veins, or your money
back."). Some laser vision correction clinics also use RBCAs. See SMUE ThAM BENEFrrS,
available at http'//www.nyu.edu/Dontal/smileJrmdex/html (last visited Mar. 27, 2001) (prom-
ising to treat cavities for free if they develop while child is enrolled in Smile program); VISUAL
FREEDOM CENTER, PROMOTONAL MATMEAls (1999) (promising 20120 vision or your money
back) (on file with authors).
Predictably enough, organized medicine has opposed these compensation arrangements.
See HealthWeek No. 202, supra note 109 (quoting Dr. William Mahood, trustee of American
Medical Association (AMA), saying that money-back guarantees "demean[ ] the [medical]
profession" and involve "deceptive marketing," and reporting that AMA "has called shared-risk
plans unethical").
169. INST. OF MED., supra note 5, at 195.
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and incentivize the surgeon, the anesthesiologist, the hospital, the nurses, and
all other providers. Or, we could engage a general contractor (GC), for exam-
ple a cardiac surgeon or a hospital administrator in charge of a CABG unit,
and let the GC assemble the team. If we were very knowledgeable, we would
handle the arrangements on our own.
In fact, we are ignorant consumers. We do not know which doctor or
cardiac surgery unit is best, and we do not possess the skills or the information
to figure this out. We need an experienced GC to make the arrangements for
us. An important purpose of an RBCA is to encourage such a personto obtain
accurate, specialized information and to use it effectively for our benefit.
Our first problem is finding the right GC. For simplicity, we assume that
we already have a primary care physician willing to make a referral. Can we
trust our general practitioner to select the right GC? As noted previously, the
referral market does not always select for quality. This is our first opportunity
to employ a result-based incentive. Having identified our goals, we offer our
primary care physician a bonus for selecting a GC who meets our objectives:
$500 if all five targets are met, $300 if three are met, and so on.117 Our gen-
eral practitioner has an incentive to develop a relationship with a good GC, to
give us the benefit of that relationship, and to monitor the GC's handling of
our case after referral.
After our general practitioner routes us to a GC we can trust, we explain
our goals and offer the following fee: (1) $15,000 for the surgery itself;
(2) another $10,000 for being discharged alive; (3) another $2,000 ifthe con-
ditions (1) and (2) are met and discharge occurs within five days; (4) another
$3,000 if all other conditions are met without a secondary infection or other
iatrogenic injury; and (5) another $10,000 if all other conditions are met, and
we attain the specified flnctional status within a certain period after dis-
charge. If all conditions are met, the total payment for the surgery will be
$40,000. If the operation fails completely, we will pay only $15,000.
In this example, the fee arrangement is only partly result-based. We
guarantee the $15,000 payment because the GC does not control all of the var-
iables that affect the likelihood of achieving our goals. Nature also comes into
play. We gain little by requiring the GC to shoulder all of the outcome-related
risk, and forcing the GC to do so will greatly increase the price.
Although we set up this example as a first-party payment, this payment
structure is not essential. A third-party payor could compensate both the
primary care physician and the GC. As long as we tie the payment to the pa-
tient's well being, both providers will have the appropriate incentives to care
for the patient properly. The source of the reward is immaterial.
170. Here and throughout this Article, we caution readers not to place too much emphasis
on specific numbers and "goals." Our interest is in the structure of RBCAs, not the specifics.
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A third-party payor might want to alter the proposed RBCA. For exam-
ple, an HMO that pays for many CABG surgeries each year could bargain for
a lower fixed component in return for a promise to refer a minimum number
of patients. An IMO could also tie the GC's bonus to the mortality rate for
a group of patients, thereby helping the doctor diversify the variance risk. The
payor could also vary the premium for a short length of stay by offering $1000
per day for every day under ten, instead of paying an all-or-nothing lump sum.
An HMO might also want the GC's promise to help coordinate unscheduled,
emergency operations or to find teams for all CABG patients with a positive
probability of success.
By rewarding quality improvements, RBCAs would encourage CABG
providers to create dedicated teams. CABG surgeons would suddenly find it
economically advantageous to monitor nurses and other staffers who provide
post-operative care as well as physical therapists that handle post-surgical
rehabilitation.' They might even assemble CABG clinics where they could
control the entire process, from admission to final discharge.'72
B. Bonuses for Preventive Care
Even when insurance coverage is not an issue, too few patients receive
vaccinations; screenings for cancer, mental illness, substance abuse, and high
cholesterol; eye examinations; mammograms; and other preventive proce-
dures.'73 Influenza is a leading cause of death inthe United States and is par-
ticularly dangerous to the elderly, but "only 52% of people age 65 and over
received the [flu] vaccine in 1993."'1"
171. See Mitt Freudenheim, Corrective Medicine: New Technology Helps Health Care
Avoid Mistakes, N.Y.T4Es, Feb. 3, 2000, at Cl, C26 (reporting that "[m]any hospitals have
made big advances [in the area of safety] by changing procedures, like requiring both a nurse and
a physician to be present when therapy begins with powerful cancer drugs").
172. Professor Sage suggests that RBCAs are impracticable because the ultimate outcome
of any treatment is attributable to the efforts of many providers, and it will be difficult to obtain
the necessary resources and contractual commitments to make the system work. See Sage,
supra note 131, at 1623-24 ("[A]part from occasional expenses for expert witnesses and other
consultants, a lawyer working on contingency is risking only his or her human capital. By
contrast, physicians must recruit outside resources such as hospital beds, diagnostic equipment
and therapeutic technology from a vast and costly array of institutions, manufacturers, and other
professionals."). Although this concern is relevant, it is overstated. Indeed, we anticipate that
the availability of RBCAs is likely to trigger a significant restructuring of the health care deliv-
ery system along functional lines, which will simplify the process of negotiating and funding
RBCAs considerably. See Hyman & Silver, supra note 112, at 172.
173. See Chassin, supra note 13, at 574 ("Although the research literature is far from ideal,
comparative studies of populations serviced by FFS arrangements and those enrolled in capi-
tated health plans show about the same levels of underuse for a variety of therapeutic services.
Although managed care plans may provide preventive services somewhat more often than their
FFS counterparts, the level of underuse in both settings is considerable.").
174. D.H.H.S., THE CHALLENGE, supra note 40.
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Presumably, much of the responsibility for under-utilization of meAical
care rests with patients. Some are ignorant ofthe potential benefits ofprophy-
lactic tests. Some understand that tests are beneficial but overly discount risks
to their health. Some are too busy or too lazy to find time for medical care
except when illnesses are acute. Some are disorganized - they make appoint-
ments but forget to show up. Part of the responsibility likely rests with pro-
viders as well. Some have telephone systems that frustrate patients. Some
require patients to make appointments days or weeks in advance. Some impose
long delays in waiting rooms instead of taking patients promptly at appointed
times. Some do not have employees who are fluent in all the languages that
their patients speak.
We do not know whether all ofthese causes are important, and we cannot
assign them relative weights. Nor do we know how best to deal with these
issues. However, we do know that businesses in other sectors of the economy
find ways to transact with customers despite similar difficulties. Every day,
fast food restaurants employing an army of teenagers prepare and serve hot
food to millions ofpeople who are uneducated, busy, lazy, and disorganized. 15
Gas stations, convenience stores, video rentals, grocery stores, coffee shops,
and bakeries do the same thing. For ten bucks, one can phone a pizzeria on a
whim, get through in seconds, and have a hot pie in less than one hour. Anyone
with a computer and a credit card can see, read about, hear about, and orderjust
about anything as fast as a phone line or cable connection can carry electrons.
By mimicking the methods of successful entrepreneurs, health care
providers could deliver valuable preventive services more effectively."7 6 Pro-
viders need only to have the will to learn the methods and to implement them.
RBCAs can supply the needed motivation by rewarding entrepreneurial
providers for bettering historic utilization rates. For example, a health plan
with 200,000 children enrolled and a historical vaccination rate of 150,000
(75%) could offer an enterprising doctor a flat payment of $30 per child in
excess of this threshold and a $5000 bonus for every thousand children
served. The health plan would collect the names, addresses, and telephone
numbers of unvaccinated children (and their parents) from other providers
(and possibly other information as well), give these to the entrepreneurial
doctor in electronic form, and let the doctor figure out how to reach the kids.
175. SeeREGNAHERNING ,MARETDRVNHEALTHCAR167-71(1999)(describing,
in loving detail, efforts McDonalds has made to ensure uniformity and quality of its french fries,
despite fact that its retail operations are largely staffed by teenagers).
176. Over a three-year period, the Medicare Influenza Vaccine Demonstration project
increased vaccination rates significantly by "distribut[ing] letters to Medicare beneficiaries,
provid[ing] physician reminders, train[ing] nurses to recognize high-risk patients, and piggy-
back[ing] vaccination messages on telephone company mailers." D.H.S., THE CHALLENGE,
supra note 40.
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An HMO might engage an entrepreneurial physician to perform a variety
of preventive services for its entire enrolled population. Many of these
services, such as colorectal screenings, blood pressure tests, and vaccinations,
do not require office visits or the involvement of doctors. The only role that
doctors' offices need to play is administrative. They need to know which of
their patients are hitting thresholds that indicate the need for preventive care.
They also may want to alert their patients in advance to expect a call from a
physician-entrepreneur.
As in the case of vaccinations, an HMO would peg the entrepreneur's
compensation to utilization rates. Presumably, compensation would increase
at the margin rather than decline. If half of all seniors get flu shots already,
there is no reason to pay an entrepreneur a premium for reaching half the
population. However, moving from 50% to 75% is an accomplishment, and
reaching the last 25% is much harder still. Payment should therefore increase
with the magnitude of the achievement. A flat fee combined with a bonus that
increases with the percentage of the served population would motivate an
entrepreneur to reach everyone.
It may be possible to improve incentives further by tailoring bonuses to
special, identifiable situations. If it is harder to reach rural populations than
urban ones, bonuses may vary by region. If minority populations pose unusual
diffculties, entrepreneurs may be paid extra for reaching them. It also may
be possible to take advantage of economies of scale by combining populations
that belong to different health plans. Individually, ten health plans with
50,000 children apiece may be unable to offer an entrepreneurial doctor a
sufficient incentive to handle all vaccinations, but collectively they can
present a package of 500,000 children that may be large enough to reduce the
doctor's costs.
Unbundling of services is already occurring in many places. Large
employers hold mass inoculation clinics attheir workplaces so that all employ-
ees receive influenza vaccines. Plaintiffs' attorneys send mobile x-ray facilities
to job sites and union halls to screen workers who may have asbestos-related
diseases. Pharmacies give blood pressure tests. Eye doctors give exams at
shopping malls. If preventive care is separated from acute care and chronic
care and is delivered more aggressively and conveniently, under-utilization
may cease to be a major concern.
Once providers receive significant compensation for meeting vaccination
targets, for following up on positive tests, and for delivering other preventive
services to patient-groups, they will develop ways to meet these goals.
Providers will educate patients about the value of these services and become
more user-friendly. In short, they will deliver preventive services to the public
via the same marketing techniques that other sellers employ.
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C. Nosocomial Infections
Hospitals are dangerous places. Many patients develop infections while
in the hospital, and these infections often involve particularly nasty bacteria
or fungi. Some of these infections are the inevitable result of gathering groups
of immuno-compromised patients in one place. Others are attributable to poor
surgical techniques.1" Deficient sanitary procedures, including the failure of
hospital workers to wash their hands when moving from one patient to the
next, also contribute to the problem.
178
It is unclear what percentage of these infections are avoidable."' How-
ever, the most striking thing about hospital-acquired infections is that hospi-
tals are able to bill for the services needed to treat them, even though hospital
personnel control some of the variables that contribute to their frequency.a °
No rational system of payment rewards an agent for a behavior that makes a
principal worse off. Accordingly, it seems logical to develop RBCAs that
reward hospitals for keeping surgery patients free of secondary infections and
that punish hospitals when these infections occur.
D. Medical Errors
We can employ RBCAs to address medical errors directly or indirectly.
By tying compensation to the delivery of error-free services, an RBCA will
create a direct incentive to eliminate errors. An indirect incentive to eliminate
errors results when an RBCA encourages a group of independent providers to
consolidate, thereby decreasing the odds that important information will "fall
through the cracks." As the Institute of Medicine's (IOM) 1999 report noted:
The decentralized and fragmentednature ofthe health care delivery system
(some would say "nonsystem") also contributes to unsafe conditions for
177. See Bruce F. Farber et al., Relation between Surgical Volume and Incidence ofPost-
operative Wound Infection, in ASSESSINo THE EVIDENCE, supra note 66, at 184-85 (document-
ing significant inverse relation between rate of infection and number of procedures performed
for appendectomy, cholecystectomy, herniorrhapy, total abdominal hysterectomy, and colon
resection).
178. See Pamela Nolan, Unclean Hands: HoldingHospitalsResponsibleforHospital-Ac-
quired Infections, 34 CoLum. . L. & Soc. PROBS. 133 (2000) (noting that majority of noso-
comial infections are transmitted by contact, primarily by hands ofhospital workers).
179. See id. at 135 (noting common estimate that half of nosocomial infections could be
prevented ifhealth care workers followed infection control procedures).
180. See idl at 136 ("According to the CDC, the cost of hospital-acquired infections is $4.5
billion annually. As more resistant bacteria develop, the cost is expected to rise even further.
Cardiac patients, for example, have an average cost per stay of $33,185, while cardiac patients
who acquire nosocomial infections have an average cost per stay of $78,151 - a 136% in-
crease.') (footnotes omitted).
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patients, and serves as an impediment to efforts to improve safety. Even
withinhospitals andlarge medical groups, there are rigidly-defined areas of
specialization and influence. For example, when patients see multiple
providers in different settings, none of whom have access to complete
information, itis easier for somethingto go wrong than when care is better
coordinated. At the same time, theprovision of care to patientsbyacollec-
tion of loosely affiliated organizations and providers makes it difficult to
implement improved clinical information systems capable of providing
timely access to complete patient information. Unsafe care is one of the
prices we pay for not having organized system of care with clear lines of
accountability.81
Most scholars and regulators have responded to this state of affairs by propos-
ing top-down solutions for organizing the system of care to prevent medical
errors. However, regulators frequently lack the information required to design
optimal systems, the incentive to create them, and the power to impose them.
Even if regulators had these crucial components, their inability to make timely
adjustments as circumstances change would still cripple them. Only informed
and motivated providers can create and maintain error-reducing systems, and
they will be more likely to do so when the systems advance their interests.
RBCAs would encourage beneficial consolidations and other error-reducing
innovations by rewarding providers for finding better ways of delivering care.
E. Health Disparities
Substantial health and health care disparities exist between majority and
minority communities.' 2 Minorities experience higher rates of heart disease,
stroke, hypertension, and diabetes." They also receive fewer medical inter-
ventions, including both preventive and acute care. These disparities are per-
vasive and long-standing!" 4 There are also similar disparities between the
medical treatments received by men and women.8
181. SeeINST.oFMED.,supranote5,at3.
182. See Am. Med. Ass'n, Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Black- White Disparities
in Health Care, 263 JAMA 2344 (1990) (noting that persistent and substantial differences con-
tinue to exist in quality of health care among white and black Americans); Barbara A. Noah,
Racial Disparities in the Delivery of Health Care, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 135,136 (1998) (ob-
serving that growing body of evidence suggests that race adversely affects quantity and quality
of health care provided to minority patients); David Satcher, Our Commitment to Eliminate
Racial andEthnic Health D4parities, 1 YALE J. HEALTH POLIcUY, L. & ETHICS 1 (2001) (assert-
ing that compelling evidence shows that race and ethnicity correlate with persistent health dis-
parities in burden of illness and death).
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See Am. Med. Ass'n, Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Gender Disparities in
Clinical Decision Making, 266 JAMA 559, 560 (1991) (noting studies that have examined
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In 1998, President Clinton declared the intention ofthe United States gov-
ernment to eliminate health-related differences between majority and minority
communities within a decade."' 6 Unfortunately, the initiative said almost
nothing as to how this might be done. RBCAs could bring the goal of equal
access to basic services closer to reality."l As outlined in Part V.B, we could
offer entrepreneurs bonuses for delivering preventive services to specific
patient populations. Companies with large numbers of minority employees
could receive favorable tax treatment on health care expenditures by docu-
menting treatment levels for vaccinations, blood pressure screenings, and other
preventive procedures. When reaching minority populations. becomes espe-
cially profitable, health care services for minorities are bound to improve.
F. End-of-Life Care
End-of-life care has been a vexing subject in health policy, health law,
and medical ethics for decades. Compelling evidence demonstrates that the
end-of-life care patients receive is not what they want.188 Often, this care fails
to ensure adequate pain control, robs patients of their autonomy, and simply
extends the dying process." 9 Scholars have identified durable powers of
gender as factor for receiving several major diagnostic or therapeutic interventions and suggest-
ing that women have less access than men to these interventions).
186. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., President Clinton An-
nounces New Racial and Ethnic Health Disparities Initiative (Feb. 21, 1998), available at
http'J/wwwraceandhealth.hhs.gov/sidebars/sbinitpres.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2001) (an-
nouncing five-step plan that sets national goal of eliminating health disparities in six areas by
year 2010).
187. To be sure, if medical providers are "overtreating" or "mistreating" the majority com-
munity, it is hardly a success to subject the minority community to the same treatments. See
Schuster et al., supra note 17, at 518 (discussing quality problems associated with "overuse" and
"misuse").
188. See James Lindgren, Death by Default, 56 LAw & CONTmIP. PRoBs. 185, 197-99
(1993) (reviewing data showing patient preferences are quite different than current practice);
David Orentlicher, The illusion of Patient Choice in End-of-Life Decisions, 267 JAMA 2101,
2102 (1992) (noting study providing important evidence of dominant role of physician values
at end-of-life decisions); Susan Gilbert, Study Finds Doctors Refuse Patients' Requests on
Death, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1995, at Al (finding that doctors often misunderstand or ignore
patients' requests and thus living wills offer virtually no protection for patient preferences).
189. See INST. OF MED., APPROACHNG DEATHL IMPROVING CARE AT THE END OF LFE
(Marilyn J. Field & Christine K Cassel eds., 1997) (recommending change of focus for end-of-
life treatment from aggressive conventional care to palliative care). To be sure, the problem of
inadequate palliative care is not limited to end-of-life care. See generally INST. OF MED.,
IMRovING PA lLATIVE CARE FOR CANCER (Kathleen M. Foley & Hellen Gelband eds., 2000)
(noting that Americans who get cancer are likely to be in pain and suffer from host of other
symptoms because of inadequacies of available palliative); Susan Okie, Doctor's Duiy to Ease
Pain atl Issue in Calif. Lawsuit, WAsa PosT, May 7, 2001, atA3 ("Multiple studies in recent
years have found that doctors frequently undertreat pain.").
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attorney, living wills, malpractice liability, bettertraining, and periodic discip-
linary proceedings as means of addressing these problems, yet these ap-
proaches have so far enjoyed limited success."9
RBCAs have some potential to improve end-of-life care by rewarding
providers for giving terminally ill patients the services they desire. Many of
these patients care greatly about the manner in which providers accommodate
them in their last days. They want to be kept clean, dressed, free of bed sores,
and properly medicated against pam. They also may want amenities such as
televisions, radios, and easy access to visitors. It is not difficult to envision
RBCAs that would tie providers' compensation levels to the fulfillment of
these simple desires. By comparison to FFS compensation, it seems reason-
able to expect RBCAs to improve end-of-life care by enabling terminally ill
patients to obtain more of what they want.
G. Service Quality
Patients routinely complain that the quality of service they receive from
health care providers is poor. Appointments are not available until several
months in the future, personnel are rude or indifferent, bills are incompre-
hensible, records are not available to all involved providers so procedures
are repeated, and waits of several hours are routine."" RBCAs, if appropri-
ately crafted, can create incentives for providers to see patients promptly and
ensure the service quality of the care that is rendered. Some providers of
"urgent care centers" already guarantee that patients will be seen within thirty
minutes of arrival, and some "disease-specific providers," such as cancer care
centers, are seeking to offer integrated services in a manner more convenient
for patients.'92
190. See, e.g., Bernard LoImproving Care Near theEndofLife: WhylsltSoHard?, 274
JAMA 1634 (1995); S.Elizabeth Wilbom lloy,BeyondMisguidedPaternalism: Resuscitat-
ing the Right to Refiuse Medical Treatment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1035, 1077-86 (1998);
The SUPPORT Principal Investigators, A Controlled Trial to Improve Care for Seriously ill
HospitalizedPatients: The Study to UnderstandPrognoses andPreferencesfor Outcomes and
Risks of Treatments (SUPPORT), 274 JAMA 1591 (1995).
191. See John W. Kenagy et al., Service Quality in Health Care, 281 JAMA 661 (1999);
Thom Mayer & Robert J. Cates, Service Excellence in Health Care, 282 JAMA 1281 (1999).
192. See HERZLJNGER, supra note 175, at 36-44, 157-99 (describing convenience-enhanc-
ing health care ventures and re-sizing of health care sector); Press Release, Loyola University
Health Services, Loyola University Health System Opening Immediate Care Center in Elmhurst
Facility to Serve Patients Seven Days a Week (Mar. 20, 1997), available at http'i/wwwluhs.
org/happen/newsre/mar97/elmhurst.htm (announcing opening of immediate care center in Elm-
hurst, Illinois: "We guarantee that patients will be seen by a health care professional within 20
minutes after their arrival at the center.").
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12. Conclusion
In the health care sector, as in other parts of the economy, the observation
that "you get what you pay for" has considerable truth. The way we pay health
care providers influences the quality of care we receive. Historically, payors
have used compensation methods that emphasized cost reductions and that
failed to connect payments to outcomes. The quality of health care has
suffered accordingly.
Important signs of change have recently appeared. Some large employer
consortiums have begun to experiment with RBCAs. They have linked their
obligation to pay to the delivery of services that actually restore health or that
are reasonably expected to protect against illness. This development, which
is still a fringe movement at best, is promising and must be encouraged. As
long as human beings, rather than machines, deliver health care, micro-incen-
tives will be important. Existing compensation arrangements encourage over-
use, underuse, and misuse ofresources. RBCAs have some potential, and pos-
sibly great potential, to correct these problems.
Result-based compensation is not a panacea for the agency and informa-
tional problems that plague the health care system." It will never be possi-
ble to measure the quality of all services or to design perfect compensation
arrangements. However, some areas of health care are well-suited to RBCAs,
and it is reasonable to expect practitioners in these areas to improve when
RBCAs are deployed. How well providers will do and how widely RBCAs
can ultimately be used are not questions that we can answer on theoretical
grounds. There is no substitute for real-world experimentation on these mat-
ters. It is hardly a response to the existing agency problems to argue that we
should do nothing because RBCAs do not solve all the agency problems with
health care delivery.
We do not expect RBCAs to wholly supplant FFS and other guaranteed
payment arrangements. Lawyers have worked for contingent fees for longer
than a citury, but many attorneys still receive salaries, hourly rates, or fixed
fees. Yet, even in the legal services sector, lawyers are still developing new
contingent fee arrangements. RCBAs have untapped potential to improve the
quality of service even after a century of experimentation.
193. As noted previously, in the commercial marketplace, companies routinely give express
warranties on some products and not on other products. When they do provide warranties, it
is common to see them only on certain aspects of products. For example, it is common for cars
to have a warranty, but uncommon for the warranty to be indefinite, or tied to customer satisfac-
tion. Similarly, manufacturers warrant tires for tread life, and not consequential damages from
a blow-out Given these patterns in the balance of the economy, it is unrealistic to expect
RBCAs to become the only form of compensation for health care services, and unreasonable
to criticize them for failing to do so.
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RBCAs can foster improvements by encouraging providers to develop
systems for delivering health care that are more reliable and more efficient.
With better systems in place, more patients will enjoy first-rate care, and pro-
viders will deliver first-rate care at lower cost. Physicians will also regain a
considerable amount of the discretionary authority they have cededto managed
care. From almost every perspective, RBCAs look like a "win-win" policy
change.
In his seminal paper on the economies of health care, Kenneth Arrow
observed that ideal insurance is "a system in which the payment to the phys-
ician is made in accordance with the degree of benefit" to the patient.19 When
ideal insurance is employed, "medical care will always be undertaken in any
case in which the expected utility exceeds the expected medical cost."195 Al-
most forty years later, the time may finally be ripe to put Arrow's insight into
action.
194. Kenneth Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Health Care, 53 AM.
ECON. REV. 941,964 (1963).
195. Id. at 665.
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Appendix
Table 1
1. "An annual influenza vaccine is recommended as a preventive measure
for all adults 65 years or older .... However, in 1993, [only] 52% ot
people in this age group in the United States received the vaccine;
among people who had been to the doctor at least once that year, the
percentage was slightly higher at 56%."'1%
2. "Antibiotics are almost never an appropriate treatment for people with a
common cold because almost all colds are caused by a virus, for which
antibiotics are not effective. However, in a study of Medicaid beneficia-
ries diagnosed with a cold in Kentucky during a one-year period from
1993 to 1994, 60% filled a prescription for an antibiotic."197 Similarly,
studies have reported high prescription rates for pharyngitis and rhinitis,
even though most of these conditions are viral; thus, antibiotics provide
no benefit.'9
3. Although "antimicrobial drugs do not shorten the course of viral upper
respiratory tract infection [or] prevent secondary bacterial infections,"
"16% of all antimicrobial drug prescriptions (an estimated 17,922,000
prescriptions nationally) were written for upper respiratory infections in
1992.,199
4. "Among hospitalized elderly patients with depression who were dis-
charged on antidepressant medication, 33% were on a dose below the
recommended level .... In a study of 634 patients with depression or
depressive symptoms in Boston, Chicago, and Los Angeles, 19% were
treated with minor tranquilizers and no antidepressants, despite the lack
of evidence that tranquilizers work for depression and the risk that they
will cause side effects or addiction."2'
5. Diabetics should receive eye examinations annually or biannually, de-
pending on whether or not they are insulin-dependent. Yet, "[i]n a na-
tional study in 1989, [only] 49% of adults with [] diabetes had undergone
dilated eye examination in the past year (66% in the past two years), and
61% had undergone any type of eye exam in the past year (79% in the
196. Schuster et al, supra note 17, at 521,527.
197. Id. at 527.
198. Id. at 528-29 tbl.2.
199. Id. at 528 tbL2.
200. Id. at 527.
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past two years). Twenty percent of diabetics had no eye exam in the past
two years.n
20'
6. "A study of seven managed care organizations revealed that about 16%
of hysterectomies performed during a one-year period from 1989 to 1990
were carried out for inappropriate reasons. An additional 25% were
done for reasons of uncertain clinical benefit."2'
7. "In a study of four hospitals, 43 percent of patients with a positive
exercise stress test demonstrating the need for coronary angiography had
received it within 3 months; 56% had received it within 12 months."2"
8. A study published in 1995 found that 9.4% of hospital admissions for
patients suffering pneumonia were inappropriate. °
9. A study published in 1994 determined that 27% of tube insertions for ear
infections were inappropriate and 32% were equivocal.' 5
10. A 1994 study found from 5% to 35% of women treated at 6 HMOs did
not receive all 7 recommended routine prenatal screening tests.2°
11. A study published in 1991 concluded that only 41*%-54% of patients
with chronic uncomplicated hypertension had their hypertension con-
trolled.:°
12. A 1995 study found that among patients with major depression who re-
ceived antidepressant medications, [only] 78% received dosages within
the recommended ranges.
208
13. From a random sample ofpatients at three hospitals, a 1998 study deter-
mined that 14% of CABG surgeries were inappropriate and 30% were
equivocal.
209
14. Although "[a]spirintherapy reduces short-term mortality inpatients with
suspected heart attack by 23%," a 1995 study of 7917 Medicare patients
hospitalized with heart attack found that only 64% received aspirin with-
201. Id. at 527, 535.
202. Id. at 535.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 529 tbl2.
205. Id. at 530 tbl.2.
206. Id. at 533 tbL2.
207. Id. at 538 tbl.3.
208. Id. at 541 tbl.3.
209. Id. at 542 tbL3.
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in the first 2 days of hospitalization."' Likewise, a 1996 study found
that although heart attack patients who receive aspirin therapy at dis-
charge have a far lower 6-month mortality rate than those who do not
(8.4% versus 17%), about one-quarter of discharged heart attack patients
were discharged without instructions to take aspirin."'
15. Thrombolytics reduce post-heart attack mortality by as much as 25%, yet
1995 studies found that 30%-57% of patients who were candidates for
treatment with thrombolytics did not receive them.
212
16. Although "[c]alcium channel blockers should not be given to [heart
attack] patients with certain conditions," 21% of 785 [Medicare] patients
in a 1995 study who were ineligible for calcium channel blockers re-
ceived them.
213
17. Beta blocker therapy can reduce post-heart attack mortality by as much
as 25%, yet a 1995 study found that ofthe 2,976 patients who were ideal
candidates for treatment with beta blockers, only 45% received them
prior to or at time of discharge.214 Another 1997 study of 3,737 Medi-
care patients determined that only 21% received beta blockers within 90
days of discharge. The adjusted mortality rate for patients who received
the treatment was 43% less than that ofpatients without the treatment.15
18. A 1987 study of carotid endarterectomy surgery, which opens blocked
carotid arteries, found that 32% of 1,302 procedures were inappropriate
and 32% were equivocal.216
19. A 1998 study of 182 patients who died in hospitals from stroke, pneumo-
nia, or heart attack concluded that 14% of deaths resulted from inade-
quate diagnosis or treatment and could have been prevented.2 "
210. Id. at 545 bl.3.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 546-47 tbL3.
213. Id. at 548 tbl.3.
214. Id. at 549 tbl.3.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 551 tbl3.
217. Id. at 554 tbl.3.
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Table 2
1. Between 44,000 and 98,000 Americans die each year as a result of
medical errors committed in hospitals.218 Even the lower estimate
makes hospital-related errors the eighth leading cause of death, ahead
of motor vehicle accidents (43,458), breast cancer (42,297), and AIDS
(16,516).219
2. Preventable medical errors that injure hospital patients generate from
$17 billion to $29 billion in costs, including lost income, lost household
production, disability, and additional health care expenses, which alone
represent over one-half of the total.'
3. In 1993, medication-related errors caused approximately 7,000 deaths,
1,000 more deaths than those resulting from injuries sustained in the
workplace that year." Annually, medication errors account for one out
of 131 outpatient deaths and one out of 854 inpatient deaths.rn
4. A study of "t wo prestigious teaching hospitals" concluded that prevent-
able adverse drug effects beset approximately two of every 100 patients
admitted, "increas[ing] hospital costs by $4,700 per admission or about
$2.8 million annually for a 700-bed teaching hospital. If these findings
are generalizable, the increased hospital costs alone of preventable ad-
verse drug events affecting inpatients are about $2 billion for the nation
as a whole."'
5. The Harvard Medical Practice Study found that adverse events occurred
in 3.7% of all hospitalizations, that half of these errors were preventable,
and that a quarter were caused by negligence. 4 "13.6 percent [of the
adverse events] resulted in death and 2.6 percent caused permanently
disabling injuries."' Studies of hospital admissions in Colorado and
Utah yielded similar findings.'
6. A 1997 study of 1,047 patients treated bythe intensive care and surgical
units at alarge teaching hospital found that in 480 cases (45.8%) "an in-





223. Id. at 2.
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appropriate decision was made when, at the time, an appropriate alterna-
tive could have been chosen." '
7. "In an [1997] analysis of 289,411 medication orders written during one
year in a tertiary-care teaching hospital, the overall error rate was esti-
mated to be 3.13 errors for each 1,000 orders written and the rate of sig-
nificant errors to be 1.81 per 1,000 orders."2
8. "Children are at particular risk of medication errors .... In a study of
101,022 medication orders at two children's teaching hospitals, a total
of 479 errant medication orders were identified, of which 27 represented
potentially lethal prescribing errors. The frequency of errors was similar
atthetwo institutions, 4.9 and 4.5 errors per 1,000 medication orders....
In a four-year prospective quality assurance study, 315 medication errors
resulting in injury were reported among the 2,147 neonatal and pediatric
intensive care admissions, an error rate of one per 6.8 admissions. The
frequency of iatrogenic injury of any sort due to a medication error was
3.1% - one injury for each 33 intensive care admissions."'
Table 3230
Failure Rate oflndustrial and Medical Procedures
TvDe of Service Frequency of Outcome (%)
Deaths from Anesthesia During Surgery 0.0005
Airline - Fatality 0.002
Airline - Lost Baggage 0.06
Negligent Injury to Hospitalized Patient 1.0
Publishing - 8 misspelled words/page 7.0
Improper Use of Antibiotics in Ambulatory Patients 20
Inappropriate Diagnosis/Treatment of Depression 58
Failure to Use Beta Blockers After Heart Attack 80
227. Id
228. Id. at 33.
229. Id. at 33-34.
230. Adapted from Chassin, supra note 13, at 568.
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